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This essay, by Ronald I. McK nnon .rdo ,,n University, is 
number six in tile Center's series of Occasional Papers, which f'ature 
broad reflections by senior scholars and policynitakers oil major de­
veloputerlr issues antd policy a;ppJlicattiols cxperiences. 
This paper foclss on a slbject of gleat sieihl'i,'anlcc to develop­
inc coutrllttic---thC importanice and rulc ',financial liberalizationl in 
capqital formation alld inI econIoICic crowth. It rviCws the traditional 
arguL+ICentS Ifor libelrabIIttion anlld conside.r-S p)FblctI5-associatCd with 
it, especially whlil pliyinakers arc trying to reduce ilalh1tion0 and 
establish alstableC ic IIc tmhasizes both the elduringI)V inc, 
iraportlance of' Ibehrah/ltonl ::I(] ol'Cowntrol I ing' Inflation f'or ecollnmic 
rovlh, and then fbCLI.lSeS Onl eise historiC inIC'hile anid South Korea 
to analyze the prolHe.lls of managiu, tile transition and consider 
strlatcgies to accoplilish 1111 purpose. 
Professtor MCKinno0 has made Irratlor cotrilutions to under­
standing the i1rrmprrtalrice of capital markets and of financial liberali­
zation folr tro\\tl in developinIg coutr1tiCs. Studies by him andMl by lis 
colleaiczELdward Shaw providcd Carl5 scholly supq+>port for Iifbcrali­
.ation, and this essay thus stands for hint as an importanlt return visit 
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in Asia ;nd Latin Arnerica*
 
I. INTRODUTION 
When governments tax and otherwise distort their domestic capital
markets, tihe economy is said to he financially "repressed.''I Usury
restrictions on interest rates, heavv reserve requirements on bank 
deposits, and compulI sorV crcdl t allocations interact with ongoing 
price inflation to reduce the a1trtCliveCness of holding claims on the 
domestic hanking system. In such a repressc! tinancial systc, i, real 
deposit rates ol ilterest onioetarIll .sels ac oflclegalivc , ald are 
difficult to predict when inflattion is high and ustalC. Thus, the 
demand for money-broadly defined to include savings and term 
* The fiust part of tlhis paper daps ant extends McKinnon (IS),X 
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dep: sits as well as checking account,; and currency-falls as a 
prop ,on "AfGNP. 
But these monetary assets naturally dominate the l"financial porI­
to!,os ofsmall savers in l1ess dCvclol)cd countries. Thus, back in 1973, 
Edward Shaw and I hypothesized that represSing the nonclry svs'ern 
fragments the domestic capital mark:et with highly adver,,e coISe­
quences for tie quality and anlllity' of real capital :1CCluiiLtilatiol: 
(I) The flow of l0oaalleNt Iuld.s Jhroutll the orgalliZtd ;1anking 
,ystern is reduced, forcing potential ivesor, to relyv more on self­
finance. 
(2) Interest rates on the truncated flow of han-k lending vary 
arbitraril\, front one class of tavored or disfavo\rcd horruwcr 1o 
another. 
3 ) 'hc proces,, of elf-fin c Wi1hi CIterpriscs and households 
is itself i1Maire:d. ILth' rCal vi Id oil depos iV---as well as coi and 
currenic\- -- f cannois nc1a'li1. ;11i0 CaNily acLuLinldatC liquid assets in 
preparatiol ,0rriiakin discretc in,.'s,Cnts. Soci,,iv costly Inflation 
hcdlgcs o:,ok a maln;s of internal filalce.more attnicdVe 
(4) Silifkant financial dCepning OLtSidC of the repressed 
hainking sv"tcri h cColIe irlm)oSSihlC whCn finns arc dangcrously 
illiquid adt/oc ii1fiLt ion Is hilinard 1,nrsahle. Kobust opc-imarkets in 
Stocks and hondS, or iIICriiCdiaiicrI h trust aIld insUraMcC cornpa­
hiies, require ruiorietart\ stahilil\,. 
Remedying fi na cial repressio:r is imiplicit in its dL1 irtition. We 
suggested keeping positi\,c ard more uri forily high r(:1I rates of 
interest ,.iiin coriiparahle categories of hank deposits arid loans by 
elirnina 'ig Undue reserve rClU irrents, interest cci los, and man­
dated credit allocatioris oil tile while stabilizing the priceOne hand, 
level through apl)ropri;tc iacioccorlornic measures on,the other. 
Then, savers and investors Would bettr the truC scarcity pricee"'S'" 

of capital, and tils rCdiicc the great dispersion iIl the profitahility of' 
investing in different sectors of thc economy. 
These strictures for liheralizing the financial system seem now 
like mere truisms to most ecenomnists-ahhough not lo politicians. 
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Today, I'-th the Worki Bank and tilhe Internation'dl Monetary Fund
 
(IMF) stres,, the inlportance of stahlii ui rig the domestic price level
 
and increasing the Ilow of generaily available loanable fi.c1 .sat close
 
to market-clearimre interest rites. Frou the perspcitive of the 19801s.
 
thosC CoLntrie.'s \vith ',slbitartilhv positive real rrttcresi rates and
 
high real hialiial s L\\ht Japan. -arwi, and Sin,a­




TilliS c1urrenc..ipH a, on tile alallta'-es ofl financial liheralizia­
tiur is llite cnr k;tbhe. \Vt-,ll lao the I97(k,,. many developnent 
ecolnoli sts-had sil 1t\ ti%-d tile g-'rlritCit fA,+d sa,'illg through 




it', rirriire tire" inteltrnal terlli of trade agains, a'riculture
 
ill Oi+lef it) ll~tl',fe ',ill cot- ollicl,. si+,illItit-s Itetht- ililllial] s.cto~r. 
(rcdit s A eltv rnrark.t rtcs of ifntCsCt. \\wre t)lcc widely 
promot'd as,, ;a l lwl,of ,tinritil ,,.siallvdcsirabfle inve.t eC~lts. 
Frillcs- "Iorli;illletill orIrepres. tillfiacial sctor w.s rio their 
iMC.' IrcII el 
Iherc" is \l," l i eIleC,,rlrCIth;t '- ()ofsal\ 11L, alld in\ec:1t elit 
VrewetIsacadl tire uinhIIll , Now, however, 
i l 

sliurd)d IV \aIlnlli \% utd IWiiic11rl1I\ d(AceruiralrII/C ill ali opel

'capital nla~lkt ai cloto',. h "eCliftiiirr rr'ere+t rate., 
Ne'\ tireles,. ;ill I,, llt %'kll ill tire !ihCral caiiti r . [hecerirual caseC
 
favorii firralt l ]iterali1tioll has, een'ii
calleld itolisi-oi hy a 
serieS f Ixuti, panics *ilid cdll i tlir SotihiCi ('0rC Of I atilt 
Arriric) i)Kri/ Ai:\le auiidtro) I liI tIr, late 197(ks aid carly 19MOs, 
\rgeriirC.hemd I itmeuu\ all iide sCius Cots0, 1t eld wild(IVIC, 
iillltl i %il e dererriilitn_ mid tri\ ;it/i iItlir coruiiiieicial banks. 
Ilnerest rate, iholh nik dcplit, arid malln' crc coiiltlCi freed, 
with tihe latter ten lcieaii, to IleI'ls\i-calWlrc"\pct1,dl. high l i 
lerl-is. l tes' uittiiilC tdi irti+ilc l lileili/itionr, .Cgieraily tidede" 
c of 
(oYveflliCrli l rCl1i tltc uiIti 1 p tip1faiillu t i2t bank,, and 
iiilniloC \ ,t1r il InrimirCi bild u1p licir ilcletlcss and 
to )ro ic 
iindtisrial CterprisCs s" \'l chldoculllcirrd iii i, sCies of revealing 
StUdiC' edited h\ Vittorio ( ,rbo ild Jail tic Niel( ()985). 
WittirOLt rCt1irlih!hotie oldeC Mlt,\ elevatshic'tfiei reIlesSIve 
. desirable sfiliantci, 1rlllle sto'beingpotentiallykitrrtl of, 
I)ulblic pol icy', ito%rcc',miii/c thai or know%ledge of how hest to 
achieve financ'iail lib, rali,,atioi 1r1ir, sCriois+ly inicoriplete. The 
0itfru in whrici the iillctar +s,teir] slabili/ed ill Coiparisonr to tihe 
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pace of deregulation of banks and other financial institutions must be 
more carefully considered than had previously been thought. 
In this paper, I begin by reviewing the evidence that financial 
liberalization and significantly positive real rates of interest are, on 
average, asst.ciated with highereconomic growth in LI)Cs. Avoiding 
financial repression remains very important ifthe economy's scarce 
capital is to be allocated efficiently. 
In immature bank-based capital markets, however, there are 
limits to which interest rates can be raised without recurrig Utndue 
adverse risk selection anioni' industrial and agricultural borrowers-­
and 	 undue moral hazard in the banks themnselves. And, without 
proper bank supervision, these 1lin1its could well be breached during 
soie major attempt to disinflatc---as we shall see. 
But 	those countries that have succeedled in sustaining high real 
financial growth through high rCal interest rates, while limiting 
financial risK, have managed to keep !heir internal price levels quite 
stable. Thus in the second part of the paper, I deal with the difficult 
problem of disinflation: how to move from high and volatile inflation 
to price-level stability. 
II. 	CROSS-COUNIRY CO(MPARISONS OF 
JN'I'ERiv;s'I Rxi,:s, PRtICE INFLATION, 
AND) REAt, FINANCIAL GROWTH 
What lessons have been learned about financial repression in steady 
states-say over a decade or nIore? Countries that have sustained 
higher real rate. of interest have generally had robust real financial 
growth leading to higher real economic growth. Some data on private 
holdings of' "broad" money throw light on these issues. Table I 
presents ratios of the broad money supply (NI,) to gross national 
product (GNP).-'One noticeable characteristic is that even the slower­
growing Asian countries (show:i in tile lower panel) tend to he more 
financially developed than typical Latin American countries (shown 
in the upper panel). Iowever, 'mtlh groups of slowly or erratically 
growing economies have fairly low ratios of M, to GNP,averaging 
about 0.22. 
In contrast, Table 2 shows financial development in the really 
II Financial Liberalization and Economic Development 
rapid-growth economies-West Germany, Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Singapore. A high and rising NI,/GNP ratio indicates a 
large real flow of lon;ablC fuds. L3ecausC capital markets in these 
economics were dort i nated k hank, ratios ol'.M, to GNP encompass 
Table I 	 Bank Loanable Funds in Typical Serni-indus'rial LDCs
 
(ratio of %1,to (INl)
 
1 )ou ]n3 197() 1 98,(I1~t MeanI} I 190)8 
Argentina 0.2.1, 0.201) 0.267 0.( 0.234I S 0.225 
Brazil o.148 
 } 1.4 
Chile 0.12, {.1310 . 1- .09 0.208 (). 
.IS 0.201 0.175 (0.170 
1411) 
Colombia 0.1L)1 0.20-1 02 3 0.222 0.210 
Mean ratii, of 	M, to (INP lot t'our latin A,.CMerin ckllountrie's 0.184 
India 0.283 03? 2n4 ( - 0:.382 0.29)7 
hili~piur, 0. io 0.211 .2 S )..2 1L) 11208 
Sri lanka 0.2. {S4 .270 R2((.23r (.317 0.291 
Turke. (.2 (.221 (1.2 ((.222 0.204o (.13o 
Mean ratio o 	lM, to ( 1 )r tomn Ahiklotuntriw- 0.247 
,,ourwe: 1MF, Itth 0 ;OloI)I (itz'tu{ \Vnoos iSSUeS), 
Table 2 	 Bank Loanable Funds in Rapidly Growing lconomics 
(ratio oI M, to ("NI' 
l9.5% 11I 1Q70 	 19806 113 
Germany" 0.331 ;4 (1..118 ().783 0.727 0.913
 
Japan 0.5 :4 0.73 :7' 0}.7}1(. (0.80.3 1.126, 1.39{0 
Korea 01.61) (). 0.325 ((.323 0.337(0.11-1 102 
Taiwan 0.115 1.161 0(.331 1l.-t2 0.588 0.750 
Singapore 0.-2 0.7C I (.068 0.826 
As well as depoits and currency,the (ernan series includes bank 
bonds sold t1iCHrlYto the publi,. 
The bias ;o dwnw iardbecause d'posit informatim on spe. ialized 
credit institutlions was not colleCted. 
Source: IM F, hlhernationul toianouitl Stalrsti(s (variours issues). 
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Table 3 	 Selected )ev eloping ('ontries ( rouped Accorcling to 
Interest-rate Policies: (;rotli of Real Financial Assets and 
Real (l)P, 19711-80 
(eOIIpuOLIIId lgror h I-aies, p icerit per aillrlir 
Ijinr ial 
I'.A .."' GDP 
1.Countries %vitl positive real interest rates 
Malaysia 13.8 8.0 
Korea 11.1 8.6 
Sri Lanka 0.1 4.7 
Nepal 9.6 2.0 
Singapoire. 7.6 9.1 
Philippines 5.6 6.2 
2. Countries wilh moderately negative real interest rates 
Pakirlan ' ().9 5.4 
"Ihailand 8.5 6.9 
Molrocco 8.2 5.5 
Colombia 5.5 5.8 
(irece 5.4 4.7 
Soldth Arica 4.3 3.7 
Kel, a 3.6 5.7 
lB.irnnt 3.5 4.3 
oi r aI1.8 4.7 
Z.anbia -I.1 0.8 
3. Countries with severely negative real interest rates 
'ci 3.2 3.4 




(;ilaia -7.0 -). 1 
M e ra"Ied ;Is lilr'a il qtliri Ieai deposits tiretl oifh cIa. V arid 

balkirig ecto rl c ie o chONCiicc, iII ti. coilsrllllel pIric inidex.
 
'he period cmeild is 171-S().
 
soilrre: I F (I 9,X3). 
tile lajin1 donestic fslo of, loatahlc Itl ds iII thC s\'slem. By 198() 
Japan, Taiwan, and Singa porc had NI /GNIP ratio,, of (.75 or more. 
Only South Korea had a much lower ratio of I, to GNP (0.34), and 
had to makC up for thi shLtagC of domestic' hoanahlc funds by 
borrowing heavily abroad. Tie other cotitrjcs shown in Table 2 are 
now net interni'nlillal creditors. 
Al1111ugh a higher rate r)f financial pi ivcly. correlatedis t 
with succCsIful real grok, th, Patrick's (I 966)problem remin11,is lIlre­
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sohl'cdI: Whlt is tle cau.se 11nd Wha1t is the Cff'ct? Is filance a leaIidng 
Sctor inI C.Onlollitc dCvclo1 )inClut, or does it simuply follow growth in 
real utpt vhich iSgenelriteld eICLe he reC'? PCrhas individxals WhOsC 
incOIteSciOW (tLickly vanlt financial aswis simply as I kind of 
C0;tlltel good i.e,, financial roxWth iN in ilC'idCetli LItcOIe 0f 1t 
grovth ccs, Tto dis:-,ntl llIc these isue , table 3 preslt,, Soic 
data fromi a.tnilh ec.nt on uilcrest- rate pli'ieC. in dCelOi1inI 
cOiiutris(I.\1l l t,'kS9..). itlc datz mal hili vIYand nlllbrll.l'>lii of the 
INF ,,,cu the critCria onM,,, h il contrLlies %% sclected,e 
For anm one1 cnLtA olr 1le, 1 the" ca,l ilnt,"cst late can Vax a 
•et dcal, c\ ui lroli p iix c o nc,tiv o x%icC C'-. Ior the' period 
foi I I 0 to 'I!. th( INII caIlcilatel 'd all ,a\cu ic eal iutcrcst rale fou 
Ca L t llll\ (ti I I rl\ conIIIIont ',Cl, IP ItltlyI a hii\ tI a dlpo it. 
C I jinC( )LioInICic CIliu l'iied aIc cCtL I() \\ lictlicu tltcir ax etice Yc ll 
ilcre i lIatc i poit ixe. iiildlx lixe. or Ii iice iC. lie­
C'tlsc Iilost 01 theseuk con llic"s hatl ltl2 1tlcilcd itict c StilC-
IItat iIl c tc) lhcles,,sSLIFCS,, I r ec c xc I Ii te ic a,\ Io welect. N xci\c 
tile 1\11. iiitItL cll to i'\lex ise the lliie xCxax,\ 'li ilie1:ittoti slrox ill 
'table 3. 
le (dicC e{isiime this sa ot01 tic i I11e ',ttdL\. ical 
financiall eioxx Ill (xxIticli is not the( ikc. a1s licasuicdcIm."i:.il saivill) 
is sh to be Ipobitix cl corIclatcc xxitlic"l ( it)h' erltiig teire 
1. The lCf-lu1nd IinCl of Filnulc 2 shox)Mx sh1,l Iltlhse, countrics that 
c, I)t\ tlopin 
Finialnciail \sst. 19)71-801 
_-' t)i 
Iiure I (ltled ( 'oulh rits: (ir Ihllof Rtal (GIPall Re i 
0'S 
7 












('¢lllpoitllt ,'.lo i l ate r cal liila.nciil a>ts ( Ito 
As (lt incd in tll l' 3 S0,,rof: INIF (1tJ83). 
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Figure 2 Slkccled i)e eloping Countries ;roupc(d .AccordingIo 
Interesl-ract Policies: Gro%%Ith of Real FIinancial Assts and 
Real (;1)1', 1971-8t 




I -I)*L - I 
3 2 1 
COUIh '.i['lllll,')Illcug~m i COLier groupings"n[
"rA,d,..ifin Tabhle 3' 

nIaintairl ,si real havt inli''  rates of interest hieher growth ral 
financial a,set1.C,as lightIC',.xpccted. Most importantly, the righi­
hand paM'i of I"i.1rc 2 shows a sigtfifi,'alt pos'tivc, correlation 
betwecen Iral "a,_s oft int-c\.t aild real rth in GDP.A similar result 
was earl icr I 17ry ), who regressedI(hItai ned Maxwell 7 real 
Oulpul grotvII on rcal intrcst rals using polcd cros,,-scction and 
time-series data I[rIn a eroup of Asian LIX . 
Wilh this kind I,1regression anal''sis, care iliS be taken inI 
deciding which \'aliables arV ex(oTerOuIs ald which endogLenous. 
Positive correlations bCwecn rowtlh Inifinancial assets and growth 
in GDP do not show which way the causality opcales. lhowever, for 
the purposes of*portIoi() choicL by individual investors, a Case can be 
made for treatin e the real raxc of intcrest as exog7eltnols. Governments 
frequelly inte,'vene to set ceilings on tonti al ra"tes oi' interest on 
bank depo'sits, and at the satle tirite they deterut ire tile aggregate rate 
of price inflation: tile rcal rate of itterest, lterefore, is very much 
determined hy plhI c polic'. ThuS lie presurimpt ior is that nonrepres­
sive financial policies, rcsulting in significantly positive real rates of' 
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'nterest, contribute to higher economic growth. 
Any positive link between real rates of interest and personal 
saving, as measu red in the (i fIP accounts, is mc.6h1l less aqpparent. The 
results of CrOSs-cotryLl St itiAtical studies lking inflation rates to 
agl'regiltC sdVing havC CCn qlitC aMlhitOuS (LeffitMi Sato 1980). 
This aitryiIit : pu/!fih!: Shouldll't sairet disco1nrated its 
inlllioll CIode's IhC reall vAluCs of finliail lssCts!.' 
In an inflationary c olom v, rCl ralcs of, In1tclc..t onl finallclial 
assets a1rC uIsutlly neati,'e. BcausC of the iiflttioil, however, the 
private ectlr • is forcCd I.) lhstain fron1 currnC coni';tlptioln. Indi­
vidluaIls must kccp addliq, to llcir nlointminal mIloncy ta aIlcs in order to 
prevcIt their rea,,tl afatllC, fo ill declining. But this Inflation "tax" 
extracted hy the overt-C ti is classified in(the (;NI aCCOun( S as if it 
verc private saviig. If )v cvcr. rcal )Crsonal finanttcial ilSSts are nlot 
aICCUmultiL . atnt Mid the tl oanablC I'ulds, to the pri\'ate sector nliy 
b. quite ov. ,. L thNugh the t., ofpi ivate ",virre,' as itt easured 
in the (;NlP acerut,,. iihi bh quite hirgh. 
Typicall\, IhCrer'I , s\V'2lten elCatitolships calot bC r'rived, rIu 
ti',n TioS- eCtionra1 .illa Icl,\I.e lithel \v ofl pe-sonll savil alld 
rCil ratesof inMte,rest1 I' mcrsoirl .,inll FrombtIe , anld infltlioll. 
erOsS-CtLI ,II i-Is is t, " orItIe-ItI" CXpic e\I'cllccoveI a1dLcade 
ofr io, hor.k Ivr.threlpsiti.ve .:lrclalilol ictweell re.l illtcro'st rales 
anld real Loe. ilr sC nis1 LIiiainbiuiio1I 
Appa li, II,! uitiv, if n LIll tity, t1' invCstment im­t th  et tlUa 
erovessignilicat l whetMittct ItIes ilre positive and financial 
imcrmdlitlioati i,rotbust. 
Interest Rate,, and Rapid IExonoinic Growth in Postwar ,Japan: 
A Revisionist View 
Does the i"e,,anr apanlese exCleriecCC support the caIsC for f'inancial 
Iibeaili/atiOll and hih interest raitcs? Starting with at very low per 
capita income after World Wa I1,lIc Japancse ccontmv grew very 
rapidly from the carly I9).ts to the c;rly I )70s. Indeed. Japanese low 
rattcr intstlgicall,y refer simply to their "era of rapid economic 
growtlh." Morcovcr, Tthlc 2 show.s robust Japanesc real financial 
growth, with it rapidly increasing ratio of M , to GNP, (luring this 
period. 
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But, paradoxically, this era was and still is widely considered to 
be one of financial repression (using our more recent terminology). It 
was conventional wisdom that Japan was following a "low interest 
rate" policy in order to provide cheap bank credits, directed by 
government officials, to support officially sanctioned industrial in­
vestments. Interest ceilings in the form of standard ioan and deposit 
Table 4 Official l)isemint Rates, I)eposit Rates, and Money Market 
Rate (Annual Aierage% 
1953-57 1958-62 1963-67 1968-72 1973-77 1978-82 
Japan: 
Discount rate 0.9 7.1 5.9, 5.4 7. 5.6 
Call money rate 8.7 9.6 7.4 7.11 8.0 7.1 
Deposit rate" 5.1 5.3 5.(1 5.( 6.( 5.2 
W PI rateoflChange 1.1 -.() 1.4 1.3 11.4 5.1 
CPI rate of change 1. 3.6 5.6 5.9 13. 1 4.6 
U.S.: 
DiscounL rtc 2.4 3.1 4.2 5.2 0.5 I 1)

TB ratc 2.1 2.7 4.0 5.4 
 0.2 10.7
 
Deposit rato2 ' 2.6 3.2 5.0 5( 5.5 5.7
 
W PI rate ')Ichangt 1.1) 0.3 1.1 3.0 1 . 9.1
 
CPI rate of cliatge 1.2 1.5 2.0 4.6 7.7 9.8
 
Ij.K.: 
Discount rate 4.7 4.7 6.4 7.2 11.4 14.5'TB rate 3.5 4.4 5.2 6.6 9.9 12.2 
1-eposit rate' 2.8 2.7 4.4 4.9 8.2 11.2 
WI rate of change 1.7 2.31.4 5.8 17.9 11.4 ('Pl rate of changee 2.) 2.2 3.3 6.6 10.3 12.0 
(ermany: 
Discount rate 3.8 3.4 3.6 .1.7 4.6 5.8 
(all nioney rate 3.7 4.0 3.8 5.3 6.3 7.7 
t)eposit rate" 3.5 2.9 3.1 5.4 6.0 6.8 
WP!rate of change -(0.5 (0.5 (.9 2.0 6. 5.4 ('Pl rate of chaige (). 2.1) 2.7 3.5 5.7 5.8 
Tithinterest rate on ,i\-1Tiotlih deposits. 
The inlerest rate on time deposits less than IS $1.00)() (itaxinnunl). From 
1953 to 1967, the naxinun rate on deposihs of iore tian one year.
 
1978-80. TIhe Bank of nglMd stopCped announcing the niniturn lending rate,
 
i.e.. the discount late.
 




The interest rate on three-lloltllh deposits (laxinltli). 
Source: tloriuchi (19841. 
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Ta)le 5 Internatioial (omparis-%. f Prime Rate (Annual Average%) 
japan I .S." .K. Germany' 
1t053-57 7.X(11.7) I.( 5.2( 1.7) X.4(-0.5) 
1 5X-02 7A -1.0)) ,.5( 0.1 ) 5.2( I4) 7.9( 0.5) 
19I3 -07 1. 1..1) 5.2( I.1.91 2.3 8.1(0(.9) 
1908-72 57 1.) o,7( ;.r,, 7.7, 5.) ).5( 2.6) 
IN173-77 ( 1I1.4 8Th 1 4>4t 17.9) 114( 6.2) 
1')78 X2 (l ' I ) 15.2, 9.1, 14.)1 lI ) 11.3( 5.4) 
N,c: thc pi ci'nhc I, pi cnr'- m -t'. t L Ihi tnI il Ic, 1i ' \VIt. 
Dktoun ( C) CL 'II bill. Ciile loICdlsi\'cout hi hc n a k oltJapanmIC It 
(IlllOita ¥3;11t1[llm)
 
'I ' iCMlI.'. 
ratLe' l oh'.en \ ci\ oCrnk',1- h.in 11ale ai o111all,lre lica.u market 

'Ili i '. en ,lll i(d l'-I 1,,11ce d li The iterl.em
1 ,Cl\ . of60j,ci m]Ot\W 

ipae ind, dliL " tli I)N ilai to l ",i  nll i 11",7 .
 
l Ihlo\Y 1r, 1 ]q,11 li l o aLpWL;1d 111C h: ,11.o\:\ Ill 1tee0 t liC nd 
I'in ()Ill )\nin \\ko'n 1n an(;l I 'llp d 
o nd opea["Ile"i\ 1hnritc nsk'l\n2hw i lica c tllks-...Ir l n trke sales 
Jaf t \vene ItC tan huldOh\l tCl llainard. Mrlitedl ci', a d 
liari2ercd 1, ,in.atinc. a )I I ohe brCtIiCnes bo ow micil.I ' 1r 0ant' 
Ja. l ll ;1nd( 111C - ()t~,4 cfelcc Io adillllis­1 :in;UlCC, ll1,l11lclttr 
ll'l%'.' efictci t h htec c'-, r cdric lleocap'itanl2 tile ow ofloll s 
biblk tI15.aol6 rnni) reproCdcel oid. 
lapacrc,i I hies lc l. \ lll.crc. Rraa Policy andats ttoel e 
FlCoc lmic (himlh sh Ilowitchi l 1984) provides aon in .lapmil,",\k-
C0n\HinCi1W Illclliali', L.it'\ 01he J;.Ipailltsc flinancial System wasthai I 
[I() SigfcnlI r"[-II, 'ltcAll_ 1' 1:01_ thI erl 01' rapid econlomiic 
crowth,I lriuch hio\,Ilial tlicial c troll d real erest aesl 
Japanl kvcre rclatli,.cl,, hilgh hy int1crilalioml slalnda.rds. Moreover lie 
asideswere e'aria-lliit n tpre Iro-, t call ino, rates and I 
large comp7.nsal Ing CCi, :Cier ndllar sne oraoeSasiedntrer ti at 
thlat the effective Ioatl rales chargel d kII),IIICSC IIidLISltN faM y-1ICCU­
ratclv ref'lected the "Illttc" )cc,_ilv p:rice of' Capital In] the econlomly. 
kl'(c, -1, 5. anld 0 simplyI reprodIuce Ih01r1i'iS dalta COnllp ing11 
.lapanceseill"CrCslI rates lto Illois,. Iil tile U.S".. lBrilain, and Germanty. One 
Cll easily see thatinomlinal interest rates onl both tile deposit ,atld loan 
sides were generally higher inJa.panll f'om the ear'ly 1950s throught 
19-72. And rememnber Ilit the ycin/dollar exchange rale wats fixed 
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Table 6 Interest Rates on lhalk Loans in Japan {Annual Aierage%) 
Loan Rate Covered LoiI Rates Not Covered 
by Formal Control: by Fornal Control: Rate of Change 
All lanks All Banks in WP 
1953-57 8.2 9.5 1.1
1958-62 7.6 
 8.9 
-I.)1963-67 7.1 8.5 1.4
1968-72 0.9 8.2 
 1.3
1973-77 7.7 8.8 11.4 
1978-81 0.', 7.Q 6 1 
Notec: (ceilings have heeii iimpt~etl tin interest rates tt1slhtirt-tnrn ( less thin : 
b 

th legal Ceil thorl-lcrnlratcs lvie ITCn tlC 

'eal)hailk lIoall,ilte Telelptilar Iniciest Rate .\tljustimeII 1.-m [ -17). Within 
Ing',[lie Iua nitnC hN,a tie facltl 
prVlla.te 

CXCHt tcd the 

CaIteI anti t ilet_ aik,,. Th,, glhilleic, I ic"tilolhcr toial, 11l;\ CbCen 
l11tI1i ttiiri1,d they also a\C beCL tiCtCjil bvC,)tvpet t1cartel.
 
The Ja.prlteCe atitlitilies c'ir il t ihie t1Cl sitni
itlll 'te 
 Ih1klri- ol theC cartcls. 
.S0111 c Ilol ,'1ithi!( I - ). 
atost to the vIet enidof ilti, pciid so ital tttlttitl itlterest rates 
could he (irllectly compared.
 
"
lut whtclher "re'al itlerelt tailes welC itgher depenls heavily on 
which iRde.X is ilCd 0tMeasIre JapaticS price inflation, i.e.. tihe 
opportunit' cos! ofhtldittg y'cLI-dcitlinttatcd [iti,1cial assets. Ifone 
uses Ihe relatively rjtpidly itictsing Co eltcrprice index P(CI)to 
deflate totntlital itleyest rales. Tithlc -1shows thaI Japanese real 
inleresl le'CS wCr so hib Otltccasiot, WCre CVCll Iwalive.1011 id, 
Ilowvcr', il'(itC uses tile sIwly growing whrdcsalc price ind!ex \WP ) 
as (he relevatl dfclalor, Japanese teal inleresl rates were rclalively 
high: 4 or 5 p OrcenldCposils a 6 or 7 percent on loars.on 0i 
ElsChCrC (NcKinnon 1973, 96-97: McKinrnon 1979, 234-36), I 
have argLcd Ihal the Wl---wh ich CpresCnlS clai i s on a broad baskel 
of (tradable) ,00t/N.-- is a hltler dcflator thLatn the (II. WhiclI depends 
heavily on rllovcncInls in the prices of doti test ically produced sect'­
ices, which cannot be held dirccly in asset porlfol ios. In itiflatiolnary 
circumstances, the relcvant aflternalive to hold in.yen-denorni rtated 
financial assets is a portfolio of tangible goods (not intangible
services), or foreign exchange assels which arC a claim oil foreign 
goods.' In Tables 5 and 6 I-rich:c rcognizes this by using Just Ile 
WPI to show that, in the 1950:; and 196ls, real loan rales it Jipan were 
higher than inthe U.S. and U.K. and comparable to those prevailing 
in Germany-anot'ier high growth coutntry. 
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l-oriuchi ,,'0C.s on to sii1Wh thielI)nCsc goverment was tar 
less succCSSI' ll than is coritltmoll\ hclievcd it fltncirm the dhoes­
tic I'low ofcapital. Tli relativclv ,,tiall flhw of ,ioZcr'llltclnt-dIrectcd 
cheap credit a\.Is aHcalocaItCd t( ",,IIIset" or decllitI iIdustries. 
funds atInternatiitall\ c-pletltiie lirls htd tI trouledC bidding IoM 
close to tile market Ie. (ofI illteret!. I IIIllI'\. t , ptlese 
I'i alicial s\ sti 'v.u,,as lt .,ili,.titf r10e.pre,sd in the ,'a of' rapid 
2coiltlii e'ro''v th. 
But leithC did 	tIle .'I i .lesCaCth1iO ii,l Iv "libcrali/ their 
iwtlo on depsit rates tf' ittcre',l,ba.tkingL, s\,stlr h\ II,-ickilin s or
 
alloirtel, tilte stadldarld i rI t d to) n(Illitbilks tO ullre­lO chll e''" be 

st'icted. or ' , t Ireel\ bt :d.
at" tih hulks io",\ a Nol did the 
l,tlin,ii\\ ltdm it, mirtjt thecenutrzl ba at\ iudom , illg of' w.vhat 
, 
. .ioi ,s f the safecolIlitel.'il l ar1d s.a i: , bi lks- \,N u ii tet l of 
tleir' ass1,it pot l ,. lill . OC liC of fi,_al sdtrpilu s tlnd the 
itl , .icc l t sie iiiit tlt tiltark t ini g \,,Ilmillcilt bolitis. the aIk of 
.iill h\ariie it\Lillk pi)i()I~loll ()I 
tile t.'tul llal hank> ttli pri te(l(a -- Il'hls "o10r­i,- ofi I 	 ail oUis 
o 	 Ii ic 
' 
l lun' .iruatnio M II 1Irtseelli(), tlv high gr,,.,.lh ill the 
ill clartII\ ba. .	 Ihiawiv:l I Ihti itt thie eintra lain nIl lli t 
Of the (tLhia-'t\ 11111 10,1s iilt\ tdipri\ tic sctor. 
1 11th ,2 t I970, tt( the lh"i.'st tm e, the .l nlec lt1\ -'reatly 
lihCI-,li/Cd ,,,, h(,t theirI llu l hi'tll, tkt ill bh~ dtI t'I'tlt , C.a.ln 	 i na'u 
lI ,Clhai situLtniui ha, ,'irttill\dtIt'stic fitiiilkial l'lkct',. 
disappeadll . hIlt ill ,ss t,,eil t killCVl t I atil Ameiclan 
exe iilces heh 1,, \h it .S tile carlier .1lapalli+s: C pericellc stucgst 
for the correI.cLt tl'tIe.r ofI, Iinta i;tal libetali/tlill'? 
l:jist, Itlmtlctal stabilIi./ itMii \\ nit ftirly c itall it dtltestic price 
level \was the piitilIpl nIde h\ \\ filch IhtiLteal inte.rest rates atd hih!, 
'Cal il llic'il ert\'.tli \c c sCUi-d. The .htap:ncse 2iV tmllllel t was 
riot often put Into itl ,tal loit of \L.i to permit (tdcidc on) high 
niuitilirl iteres.,t atte in rle to0Offset 	 Ihi anL v;ariablC domCstic 
Sc.tiil. ,tIll\ afttel ,substantial firlrtcilcldeecpnintg ill the riortbarik 
parts ofthca.lpital tmtikct gtlvth Iii priltarv ScCtietCs ttradiril aid 
increased intermediatim by finance and ,t ceuinsuran companies, pC­
iOnl ItttlIS, : oiIO01 -- did the atinho 1rities substan tially IooSC1 1, (or 
begin thinking 	aliont lOOsciIirug Ii)) Oil what the commercial banks 
could h(1t. 
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Thil-d. tile (loflest ic hah sytm a never pu in the Mioi
 
of' heint' the principal ltijiancial illtie 
 diar-v fur s'U'iftiCallt ;1,11nnntI 
fo~v 
.
of nt cf ial lrnnabtud ith it',atelufant direct orijidirect
exchange risk. Thei liinitet! Iorcign capi tal coingi into.!ipan wNas inlthle ForlintofdirCct in esllntilt toi. 11101 tetIlIllo 
 )I. took Itle turin11 of* 
H-figh Real Intecrest Rates illai a
 
''l 1-1. '!h it'
Is jict-lt\ tI andti1(ltti'-latc JpoI ieis ,ice 19~60, Taiwan 
deve~loopi, ctolit rv.
 
liltioti 11lnoriN l dC ldt'Ii 1,11
J t) 1ti I ,1I l I \ il al st I~lsh ae 
\\JtJ lttnrII Iol i i tim LILSd In CN)(k Iillill N- dll s! j sjI(Tnots [ 
Sttlllde
v'ot loid Il I c .>o.Itlli. ahldrmllmllloli ~.lI4s 
Navell tp aelitot Itlc i ltoitm hcio icji vi 
s1,AIC. Schi sIilWH11 ii j '1 1witId\, o i (d 1.ii1 allJm tiLit and 
lvl.Q W i \iwi h iroo5 ic tri11;1 loldoesi, raCt C IIitII l.es ssfItCi nIareI 
thtn iteied rae il tl 1 1lik-1 1amN(lioot.ttti c illi llt t0 isoiad 
erct ill m th ) (fl s 5IO iit 5dd s~~ ui le a
 
ltei C9 lie tti11
H, elll w ll W I li i ltiill llt illetd.ilt i hl 
WIiAtte 5,\t to1bu)ld ()ICC1 their Jii tcW~ 

S\'steni inaliajoclm llcl 

Ln itiitesicaoii 
\x1ticwel CfIn Mliloit 2. kiil 988laiwn, [lie/ Ir'wl i(dodmuss1i xcetlislmt uni,111nd is fiime hatFot 
Financial Liberl/iZ-t1 (1n !(Uluwii 21an Ievepnm'nr 
thle -typical- Latin American cmnIINnu in11 I. The flow of'shmwi Tahle 
private lhunahic: f11nd" 1( ',tpp44rt thune1si c. and iiow h~ee.invecst­
1114n11, halCCtI11Ic c2144114iU. 
TO 1,lllpo-IIfiese hIIIL 4Ap4\(41..Indal,11\II to~ (,1)0J04S loan rateS 
o, cre also kept high -k~ ( Oliv~ae polink higher thanliwot thr 
thle standard interet ra1(11 ear de po),it -and werediMIoC-\Cf I maies 
alnyvwhere -let%\ cell 10 and I rI!Iclnt per1 war Inlnorma,l riniflalionl­
arv iiIc's. A.IIII4nghi ',0111 tInan1cal r-cpl-cs"Ioz e\1IscdIl ile fbnn1 of' 
pirt'i'Iiel 1(cic.s( 1'4!I ~hle 7). wereel[n1 lates expm)441(TaI (hiec rates 
geiieiall \ kepi j)W44\i\C and NUI)I,1111 IC1 toin1Siiilor was thissaI ia 
CoiIIIliiII11it~icliitI'MCC C\p44iwrs" Sl1llicill (44 lndciiiiie1 tie central 
bhink' 4.44ii44 m\ tile M 'I\aso- tiiikc the Km-412ai e.\peri­(114..' hi411 
en4.e WoN: 4hI-CtIssCdhKl4. 
Ill 'Idhili441, a \ i2441441)N 4:111) IMiil'ortai 11talt­iniaikei reniailedl 
~ittllhl source(' 1*41 'h1saliese hili (m. hlmllselilds (thatiIaCe 10 l 
aIiiiii Ill\ Inihals 1 1 hecawise ihle\ \ re slat(4w1e41 cited 
ITble 7 hlicrusi IRalv, anid Infion~i~ Ra~tesI aian. ( ttina. I')56-t984 
441 S~t IM-Is 11c d I 44C UI4L5 tPIILC4'..II FAII4II 
4903. 14)7,; (14.1 (4. 1 7.7 15A4. 
19)74 1.. 5 15.5 4)9A) 1).)1 47.5 
194, 12.0) 1.0) 7.1 21.14. 
(417) 10,.7 (2.7 TO1 27.o 21.5 
1977 ).5 11.3 6.5 25.60 7.0) 
11)78 10 1(.5 0.5 27.2 5.8 
1),79) (2.S (5.2 (10.5 30i.1 9,8 
(920.5 (6.2 (10.5 31.3 (9.0) 
('98( (In (5.2 ((110 301 10.3 
(98.,2 Q))0 10.7 8.2 27.7 3.3 
19)83 8.5, I(1.2 8.0) 20.8 1.8 
19F4 8.A) I0.1 7.7 -)1).() 1.7 
.5444 4 (ch nlL (11117; I(1c (Cennal(iik41&(i4a t4\.44.(i1i.1i414i 
.S1(jl11i( .i,11ith 4 4rM444 4414i 101 F ning an~d )ev. Ist442\ (urICI 4411114tlikla Do (4-
Illll ni1;4\4I 144444.11.1 .~n.1u/1)414 I 4,. 4)4,hm 1ucI984. 
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undertaking unduly risky lending and vying for deposits, the govem­
ment imposed standard-albelt high--ceilings on deposit and loan 
rates of interest. This created a large fringe of unsatisfied borrowers 
who could then hid for finance at interest rtes ofl 25 percent or mole (Table 7) in the curb market wit/hout impairing the safety of the 
monetary system. 
But even in curl-market lending. the rohusttwss of the monetary 
system remained important. The principal fin',ancial instrument, the 
promissory note from borrower to lender, was the posldated check. If 
the check on the state owned bank bouinced, Ihe government could jail the borrower. In addiltim, the overall stability of tire price level 
Made such conltrIctual arraneI enlts mnore attraclive to both borrow­
ers and lender, at Ilorrcr terrir s to maturi v than in similar curb-marke 
lransactionS iI other devClopinlle Coulltrisc. 
0nlv II tihe carl,, 1980s ]id the dcvclpmCnt of more conven­
tional Inic\-n111;rrket illt-UI lellt,-I, sulc as lconluiercial bills, bank­
ers Icceptalnc ,. or IreCollable cer ifici,s dofeosit-becole sig­
rrificant. In order to bidf for fuIi, in corpeition Will these muroey­
market ill',rrUrCr \, ilh ril%\ inteirest rates, the cnimnercial banks 
were progecssivelv dcorilrolcd and decentlIli/ed (Kohsaka I987).
In the longer tcrm, firanci by isuranre aii trust collpamnics and 
new Stock issues rose to rure tranr nargmial iInI)tl.ince. Thus. after 
almost two decadc, oif reilrarkable financial deepcning with price­
level staiiliv, ol6nolm is ltaian 1inrall\ hwlserin,, rip its light 
contrl, til , hat its baniks cai do. 
'losccurtlcor ct~rufncr'"tirrlirrnei'uliberali/atior, how best 
inight le lai anCse tir nirairl ' stlelrr rrrlituric ftIrhr'? Fturther 
deregulation (f tile commnrrercial bark, is ritl uily \velco)nc but 
virtually' irrvvc1 tallc, altori tleir risk-takin, activities should 
remain linited irr uder hic vof threpre_'serve tt tir ri'or0CarV sVStell. 
hlowever, the rclati\minpmntanlCe of thie corrnercill bainks, of other 
institutions with Iu ,i.h, insurCd deposits, should diininish. New 
higher yield arid [UirIrirCd rioirev-urarkct irl-urrenits in lie "oran­
ized" capital rn1alket Should raduall) replace tile curb market on the 
one handlt ftax laws are propcrl\ Cihi-CeCd)arid the Useof fixed-rate 
denand anid say iigs deposits on the otlier. ILnt'er terni bends and 
nmortgages Should mtorebectnic cornnir)place---alo wilh new 
equity Issues fo riskier a':tivitics-- if the voverinierne ainlains a
stable price level intol he indefinitc future. 
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Premature Financial Deconfroi in Chile 
Although measured and carefully delimited financial liberalizations 
have worked well in the cases of Japan and Taiwan, more sweeping 
attempts at financial decontrol have sonretirnes conie to grief, as in 
Turkey, Sri Lanka, and the Southern Cone of Latin America. It is 
worthwhile tracing out one such experienec. 
In the late 1970s, all three countries in the SouthCn Cone-
Argentina, Chile. ,and rug..av---had stubstantially deregulated their 
banking sys'eris lw/ore bringing inflation und:C control and ,rchiev­
ing significant lfinancial deepening. Indeed, all th;ree conntries sIt­
tered from SUbstanllal il.acroecollollic instability at the time that 
interest ceili ,s on hank deposits and hoans were rernoved-and 
hanks were allomvcd to cotntroteI'reel, in the capital narket. 
Only Chilc, however, had stiffi_.-nt riscal control to miake price 
stabilization and fiMcial liber'aliZatioIn a fully credible objective of 
public poicy. lhis 'he Chilean e, ;crieircc fron0! 1976 to 1982 with 
bank supervision is ,soneht cean.er e1ar,11[le of lowulCOnlolled 
interest rates night work when inflation is still very high and difficult 
to predict. 
IPrice inflation sLarLed f at over 170 percent per year in 1976, 
before falling to less than IM)percCnl in 198 1 and then rising again. 
Table S s mrarie, somecxtensive Chilean financial data provided 
by Rolfilrtders I 11)85 )on the extraordinary patlterl ofdep ,sit and loan 
rates--- both nominial and real -alter most commercial banks had 
been rcturned to( the privatec sctor by 1970 and o.l[icial interest 
ceilings had been reItove_.d. l\\o characteristics stand out. 
The first is the very high real interest rate, calculated ,. post on 
the basis of 'xpericir,:edinflationl rather than on .kaitc'expectations 
of t. For example, iII 1,7X the 'real' lending rate on peso lr;ns was 
42.2 percent on antaualied basis.---.altlough lendirig was typically 
milch less than a vear "inl dulrationl. The net aInutal ized spread between 
peso deposits and Iloals was abott 1).7 percentage points, after taking 
out the eftects+of reserve reqUiIirelnents. "O achieve these real yields, 
the noniiiial peso loan rate was 85.3 percent. less than a third of what 
it had been in tile inure inflatiotarv year of 1976. 
The second striking characteristic of '[able 8 is the large spr,.ad 
between the apparent interest costs of borrowing in pesos compared 
with borrowing trorn domestic banks in dollars, which, after the 
deregulations of the mid-1970s, accounted for almost half of total 
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Trable 8 Chile: interest Rates on 3 )-I)as Bank i)eposi 1 and Loans 
(% per annurn) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 198') 1981 1982 
lenio Deposits: 
Nominal l97.9 )3.7 62.8 -1(. I i7.4 4(1.8 47.8 
Real' 8.0 I .5 _)1 .4.4 -4.8 28.6 22.4 
Peso Loan.,,:
 
Nominal 350.7 156.4I 85.3 62.) -17.) 51.9 
 63.ARe' 6.3 56.8 42 (6.6 1)Q 38.7 35.1 
Gross Spread 57.2 1.7 14.5 12.1 7.1 12.3 10.7 
Net Spr,:ad 8. 17.4 1(.7 7.4 5.2 6.3 9.5 
Interest Di ffercmiak
 
Pcsti/l)ollar dcposils 2.9) 7.8 
 0(.() 8.7 14.0 19.5 -1.2 
Peso/Dollar (halls 48.9 36.4 8.6 -1.I 17.1 24.3 5.6 
Dollar I)cposits: 
Nominal 8.) 8.0 11.1 13.5 13.1 17.8 14.6 
Real' 
-(8.I 7.9 4.0 -5.8 12.3 7.6 4(0.) 
Dollar I.lalns: 
Noinaiil 13.9 13.9 16.1 20.7 91 22.2 18.3 
Real' 
-( .3 12.9 9.3 1) -8.6 ((.0 4-1.5 
Clhalle ill 
(onisuiIIer Price (7-1.3 63.5 30.5 2(0.7 
All real 1)c, intres) rate ale cai .iill('t Illillhlv, h,le 1d oil lllhillv Chainges 
iili(h('ii il ( UniUler Pic-, lile\ iii P s, ,bhelore bein alliiialied. 
' uNonmina(l eposi rfilet ill b010\%(olh( M t [L1 )li I il I ;ihl'id: I()R plus 
avert' c sprei",d citIi i (h cain('1)ii lllc'ill Piliks.Nomtlitn l dtillmihllom lift' lll u,!'
I 'I , Jl1lW't'J I (l lll11CktICLlNM Lt N,tb\
 
Ne sil il It'i t tC C 'it ii l illS ('i ri(ac Illilei,il h11'oIHI.l ,l -s \ iiiiWe slclcl i dollriiimeer'irsill !l Iltila lk I hO ­(t'\pllL'llL'L'dt 11o &'I C (ilC\t h~lll,,L cVithtliltit~ll. 
Tht " t 1Wilt' lt"1e re iil tl l l. 
II llulili [;llt') f liale'3j dt", lhlmllo( l 
1 4 jwt,,li11ll lll rMllt
 
Net -LIIidAIlC'I
)rCt t011CLk (11 
, 
1illllkl.-  tl'l .i r wr011I I1ve require­




bank loans (Ltlers I9,5), Adjuslted (lownwar(l for the experienced 
rate of peo0 dCvalati)n, (hiS Splre,ad wa aIshigh as -18.9 percentage
points in 1976 a1nd (heni fell [o a)"(ill high 8.6 perctliag )oints iii I9)0 
before increasing (o24.3 percentage points in 1981. I Iheil fell 
sharply with the irp1riSC'" dCvaluatiIns of' 1982. Indeed, (RChn the 
.real" cost (adjusted fo tle d(omesic atC fIpricc infl1lioni1 less the 
rate of exchange dcva ti(n) ofborrowing in dollars was negative­
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even though real borrowing costs in pesos remained very high. 
At the time, virtually everyone thought this difference was due to 
imperfections in financial arbitrage because of the remaining restric­
tions on foreign capital inflows. Indeed, this belilef prompted the 
authorities to loosen capital restrictions even further in 198G-thus 
worsening the overborrowing syndrome. Corbo (1985) anlalyzes the 
unsustainable real appreciation of lthe Chilean peso, associated with 
the buildup of external debt iW11177-81, which led to a sharp decline 
in the profitability of the tradabl, goods sector. 
Sadder but wiS,r, we n)ow Understand that these incredibly high 
interest rates oil peso loans in large part represented the breakdown of 
proper financial supCrvision over the ('hilean banking system. Nei­
ther officials in the colmmcrial banks themselves, nlor government 
regulatory ;uthorities. adequately Ionillorcd the creditwortl enss of 
a broad spectrum of industrial ald agricultural horrowers: 
The ibic l ill ('hoi t, rati loalsmince ill tofitti.lh, er a roli nteh rnatd 
g tz +C.[it)liigIhwithin' kHg ,,,tvm. I'~lic vttlth ,t 1, ~~ l+ I,,t"tclilt ~ ~ mtclc,t~~ latd\.ht~ ~ ~~~ h ~ ~ ~ ot! ctmr,dtit, which, 
whICII idded to tiIe dulnHlMtd lhilt'llt l nwtmilk hc %lahle, idhowed real 
IlItt't ltlk"-, It0 IC' CiIh t111Llt ItCt_ IC(nl't (MIll! t1) tl ll I Ih Ib C) ICVCh,. 
(I Iartk_. gic l()8s, -1 7 ) 
hl0wc,,CF, hild l pCculiarly International 
flavor in which ('hilean linancial iilermediarics--not only banks­
incurred cxchanec risk as Ithcy c\tended had loms. James Tybout 
(1985) and )lters have shown that the hareecoioimic groups, 
'Grupos," used their cotitriol over dot testic banks together with their 
overseas coitirats t, gel (1lar crcdits at relatively low interest rates 
to ,elernd at the extremely high ittcrest rates denfomiilated inl pesos to 
borrowers of ubliou, creditwOrthincss. 
Because banks wcre officiallv restricted from directly assuming 
foreign ex\change xpo-sure, they simply made dollar loans to the 
Grupos' industrial companies, which then did mo.t of the ongoing 
lending in pesos. Thus. by assuming the tomeign exchange risk 
themselves, these (GIrupOs ctiMCCtd to show increasCs in their nionop­
crating earning in I980 and 198 I. well after their opeirtting earnings 
had soured because of thC Cxchangc OVCival natiOi aMid contiminued high 
interest i Some were record ire unrllized capttal gains, from 
solle ', us assels, as earnings on their books. 
Of c. . ny Chilean firms need not have known at the time 
that they were ciagagcd in a lPonzi game. Many probably suffered 
'!'his 1f0-r1 OfTIA 0MV'ICgm, 
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fr m excessniveaLin 
from optiriism regarding future asset value, and rates of
returnlhopes' tht were ultimately dashed by the real exchange rite 
overvt,4uation tind downturn inthe interna ional economy in 1981-82 
that led to'masive losses by firms across .the export 'and import­
omnpetiiig sectors. The resulting series of defaults on outstandingbank 	credits -ncluding tihose tothe' lare ­
ruptcy onvirtually all of Chile's financial intermediaries. 
In 1982-83, the Chilean banks were all renationalized in order to 
'protect the positions of domestic depositors and foreign creditors­
even 	though tile government had not previously committed itself tod'posit insurance. In a similar set of bankruptcies in Argentina, 
official deposit insurance had been more explicit. Nevertheless, the 
upshot in the two countries was the same. The special position of the 
banks-as custodians of the nation's money supply--effectively 
meant that the depositors and the banks could behave evante as if their 
deposits would be insured in the event some major financial break­
down occurred. 
Price-Level Stabilization 
What are the lessons to be learned from the rather cautious approach
to bank regulation inJapan and Taiwan incomparison to the Southern 
Cone experiences with complete decontrol? 
Obviously, sustained stability in the domestic price level is a 
necessary condition for achieving high real financial growth without 
undue risk of some major financial panic and collapse. When general
macroeconomic and price-level instability ispronounced, the use of 
extremely high nominal rates of interest to offset anticipated infla­
tion, and balance the supply and demand for loanable funds in the 
capital market, becomes very risky-although perhaps necessary. 
I11. 	 THE TRANSITION FROMi H-IGH 
INFLATION TO AS'IAIILE, PRiCu, LEVEL 
Designing a successful macroeconomic stabilization, where the 
economy moves from very high to low price inflation, isitselfa major.
problem. From the starting point of a (typical) inflationary and 
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part ia!lly indedCX~ less tic yelopcd ceoli ltV Withi unlonitrolled gover­
ment deficits, stIppuse that a uIalOr IsCalrtniSu~ddeilV makes full1'1 
friointillrv (price-levch) sahili/atioln ItCaihle. ( ovenlne11cll expenldi-
UlileS. iiicludiii' cledit \tib',idics lIiiiteed h%Ithe centrial hank, are 
retiticet ilih/Mui iaitIoiil 1,1 Oiciiicst.Ite\eiic lWise 
(Uile tlifferiit C \ cieiCHLC's( i jd Knicii with jiflation andi(f'111m 
Aisinflatn Ii the Lot, I 97(tkleiivi iScmar iisel ibechmairks. 
enihiavk (It cie.-dthIc Iiie:;iltiN I'mr \ii"lithC/1w tlicii dllics;lti price 
level" i' ildit I)r11ill - AoI cci i III a miaipl)l i H o c I i/aItll. 
hllmk l-L~li t) 1Weicdikcd Ill Ote timIiiiloii 1t1iiii \'ci\ ito~t low 
1mck itiii\,I\ iiiltc\cd \ I~.tll( c1ci c1iit. jl iic"t ites. As 




luti1st thtlCs koc\ I10'nun Ii i)i t.N i i iInt pYCV\'emt 
St~riohtis jI[~ C ill it. itt r1c11ic basic l~'lii"'. 
" TInCUR nit i11cci-i lie.ccciiie mlci liai Nhiitld a-ccss to 
LI ilL piI h., 111c ' 
" Il~li-&-iia1 i);ick\\;il C:11i1 r iiil'\Iii il\\ ;i'sil\alu onI~ 
'It allaletilrc liiiliicii wklicri liiw in keli(M C\Clalli1e 
reslitct ritnd auh \ ilm nrct\ tojiediit thisinhia 
tioll. I "hall use ;I Iiistoirit:iI c s~tilpproichi. [lie ti'e!d Chiileanu 
st-1hili/atimlu itliilipt 114)1ii IW/ tiw7~t2 is trcatct lust,;.Ihici Somie 
key tltieiCiccs,s\.1111tilt I'lcclsi.11i0nie 1)(t IeY, di imiaing,Korean 
stah~ji Ilj ()tnIit arc poiiitcd nut.Q17() in) I1)XS3 
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Economic Repression and Liberalization in Chile: 
A Brief' Review 
','3v the end of 1973. virtually every [easure showed that the Chilean 
Ceonruv had hOCconc irMasSiv..IV repressed. In freigjn trade, ex­
trerlely hi h tariffs on the ordcr of' l() percent (lahic 9) significantly 
MdCrstatCd the act'lal degrc of protection. iFxchanl'. c(mtrols, 
quotas, al oVrlh lprhillIoms proliferated over the whole range of 
bolh iniports and exports. 
Tale I) vl1 the asic MLacroeconomic and linancial statistics 
[Ir thc ('hi1can ccn(omN from It.7(t t IUSX2. Reachitg almost 25 
percct of t.iNl) in 1973. th1e r-over-mmrmmCet budeet deficit was out of,
control arid had beco'imc fully ruretiiefd. But this undCr-tatCd the 
cxtetlt t) \, hich Inc centrIal knk either direvly or indirectly--was 
lforcCd to providC stlsidiAed credit liles to a wide variety of enter­
prises ard _c rl111Iit a,geric e throticlrotit the COlultrlV. 
Iablic 9 ProlIt. flit,Oit hiial Iarilf RItIiuri 
1iril!Iiall larilf late 
,.tlLtYL, 1 ( .ercerll ages) 
1973 
197-1 
J t nl4 













1970 Jarnum ar-June 38 70 
Jill\ -I)eccllbe 33 60 
1077 J'in iar, -Jiulic 24 50 
Juts -i)DcL'Cbei 18 35 











Wilti few exceptins for smIre (hur lnlr atll) ,ii1rtoliv vehiclfes. Smaill cars 
ilIIu be imported al the iaJldaild laill'I laels. 
0 [ftic 4,3(01 commln)ities or tariff line, Ihat are classified tor cuslomns 
I+lrtlp0SCs, 01irk 12 air eXCir1pr i'm diulicS. 
Soiurce: (enuratl ituuik oft (rile. 
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Table II (Chile:MIacro(economic (cc-, ie, 1970-82 
'rI i I I , M 
' 42 WlJ . IIAll . 111 , If' I I , 1 12' h It 1 4 1 f ',S ?1 11 ' 219' 
11.11 {$Cv . t~l~iS. i1Rt, I7 I 1 9.9 1.0I !11 S 2 17 I19) O, (.04 
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IS, I l %1%11 I 12 I 1 2 I i90 2 .SI1 I ISS 24(9 1 N IS 41 7 IS16+ 1 7.
 l, l %I 179 0 21SI hS13++ t I~l M \It1l , 2 q,X 2 IS 5 1 4711, 24NS6 1 I'M .1461) 7643I,hp~),lI) SI'N1)N, 'I'-S I 769 1.7,t4 52(I 147) 2151 26~l, .-IS) S41)9 1513 11,4.1 
,I "lI 20 +211 149 ) I MIS6 I1I , %"%1"S, 1) 491 5 - 1.971 4.731 -2.1)IM 
41 $. 114 -21 -55 -344 414 11 712 1(147 124.1 701 -1.165 
Si l. I D1I'l 




- w 5 
II, I .I I, -l I t I'I . +7 2.1 7 115 2'6 211 I A 1.s -1.7 -.3.1 "1.6 2.A 
12, Iolld 'h.11101,.11 
IilIlh 411', 1, 1 117 17)1 A4. ' 14.2 12.4 At. 1 35.1, 43.3 
I i ,I-, I ) 2 2 12 7.5 7 2 1 ,1 31. 2.5 2.1 11.0 -0.02 
.lm'Pri, r% 
) (1,7 5.4 (..5 .189 9.5'L'l n;I . 1) 1 I 1 7) 310.7l 1743 30.3 1,2 20.7 
IllIIr j' es-7 1.1.171 570.7 410.11 151.5 65.01 1) 58.3 -82 - q 34.6 
[ 171 Rte.,l \W.wvtRmct 
Inid-\ 1 1171' 1 h IHI 11 (9) 2 ,45.9.Pb 1+(08 (1,1 10 92,t) 96 2 87.2 96.5 1 1IO.C, 107A1 
(I Rt'dIL\d+~llove RI"¢ 
Irate\ 1 I 10It75 l12 h 9Y 5 t¢)s 1) ,10 IN ( O 3 6 , IP 7100 A 4 1tl.7 87.9l 
,
Indlt, I PI ItlItl(A1 .Is 1) 1.1 , ] SPI7 7 , I 1€41 /(1 Q) 
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111 14)70 alnd 1Q73 illptol Nlhc, mie c~'.,rN+,,d C'1l millionst' tl tdollmNr.
 
SNo)mina~l Of 84a tSt '') JIL' h NAC;h". tIl-11,1Ch't b.', ollI10M ('iTl 
1 olIS,/I 'C,,.o, 
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F-yx l-r Ji+Tcl..,/11ltlp ll PIILt.
 
.%'14/( c: [.tdltkr' ( l9151+. Itt,, 1/ Bh. / ,,, l f IN,. 1).If lt" ,. ,ands', Ill /m/h t ooll), andlt 
"llonfthA 111111"'il, 13 l't 
€ "C lital de (*;III(.,'.jllot~lj ',I'¢.(cs 
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Chile lhada loi1 history of using tihe central hank, and a large 
state-owned comniercia lbank (The Bank of Chile), to pr(;\ide credit 
S,bsidie. for "development" p)riTses to enterprises thoughoitlt the 
,:ountrv. But Under Salvador Allende 's Socialist government from 
1970-73, wv orker cOllfe'ti\'e.S seiCd o0pcratii2g Cont rol o'Cr most 
industrial e.nlrFTises ai Sol.' kg, f"amrls. lcoau:s ,.iltcs rose 
sharply rel'ative tV tihe ( i iiu: v fro,Cn) iutlpLtprice,,, these enter­
priSCs bCuI toiru with far e negative cash fows----, hich were then 
covered by ncw aid extenled credit litnresfrom the ankint system.
, 
massivcThr reslt%w .ts illtitio in the mid-1 9 7), Ipartially 
repressed in 1973 lcUv irtrols ut sHuSqLleintly bc)Coming open 
inf'lationr with their rcllnova. BCuse of the inflation, interest rate re­
strictiris, arid healvv rcscr\ e i.flUircents (ree thln l percent) on 
deposit haolletiri:the finncid si.sin oteI)CI'd withb nk, \ hr rCat ivc 
real rttcs of intelest lm It)73 rlo I975. lThe domestic flow of 
loaIalIfund, ill 111,,upi, orgari/cd citail rirarket was virtually
 
nonexisternt. Ill \ic\, of this, ,coioulict 
 chos, iswell as, f'r political 
I'Cisoll, IbriCi."H caIpital oilther thL , sut-trrmn tadC Credit) wa.s 
coiplctcly urravaihIab+ to ti1o. ecorlnyIv.('hihaul 
Ii In7.+hi.. heref hc rr atrriakable series of liberalieinirg
 
refriwll, 'aId111.s t.',,tl aid
Mmdta[\fisc'al stabili/aiorr-the 
rCsults of' ,,vhiChare ilnlrnir i t.vy ,eo\'ilnt iflir glari:irin at Tables 9 
and I(.(oVeInIrIlHCIII CXeCit(l-s were cut, inconiL taI\cs wre ra­
tioiili,,d, arid cormodit' ti,\cs \,.re coi solitlate throlugh the 
illll)oiliori l)a tiunilim2(0 fcrit %,duca addcd tax. By 1978, the 
'iscal (1lficit,'asr'igliihlC mid surfrplusecs developcd in tiC next 
three yc'rs. 
Iqually importat, the go,.nrret tUndertook additional draco­
niriM irCsuCs to liberafi,e tire domiestic finanuial syst emr. It phrased 
out atitoriC (rfficial Credit line, to prop ip 1'illing industrial and 
agricultural enterprises. Reserve requirements om deposit taking 
banks were graCly rCILucd. aMid by 1970 tornal interest ceilings on 
deprsits arid loans were climiated. ('o wria banks, the principal 
financial hmtrrredia,~i.,, were Sold back !o thre private sector--tirus 
creatirg a vigoi ts co iirpftiti\' riirkct fbor deposits and loar;s. Inter­
est rates rose sharply fromi iegaiyive to very high positive levels, aid 
thus encouraged high rreal iraricial growh ('1able I)). 
With the bene fitof hiudsig ht, however, we row know tht 
interest rates, becarre unduly high in real ternis (Table 8). This created 
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severe adverse risk seiceion anl'10 ll1 nonbank borrowers ani substan­
tial moral hazard among tile banks themselves-as discussed above 
(pagce 25). This failure to exercise proper supervisory control over the 
banking svstent was iiot, at the time. ecogiIed a.s such but became 
an imp ttmortant a, ltimate breakdowkn olChile'scoiihntiv ctor to the 
ot1herwisC Wvell-dOSignd prtcra ofccoitlonic lircraliation as we 
shall sec. 
Rieforms \\,re equatlly rlll alC in the 'loICIn trade sector. 
Nontai ilf barrier. had KecCn pirtt 5 .. elIClititMcd b,, 1977: Tablh 9 
,er 90,era it1 1973shows hMN tarifls ci 1) ipec int wvCre scaled 
d(lit to a flat I) pciCe it acro.s all itmpo~nrtcd cotiodities hy11mid 
19 79 -- a retbin v,hich lasted throuch IS2 
(iiivci tte ,c%crc distortions thaI had dcvcloped in Itle ('htilcat 
ecoit ttI ,' bV I973. these new polilic,, I itrcit ilCIItIltioIial trade 
and elit'itaime dtltsic financial rcprcssion .ccicd to be leitlarka­
bly well ordcrcd In a, tetboccnse. lIcy \'. crc %'idel, applauded 
by ;I[Inot all cc th, oi 'ltoetct bsr\ e1rs. T[us the,t,w ,.' jisthair d 

nuitllCrou', IxMn,. ilillCre e t rll o llie cco lIoIV trOlli
kine lli ,,C \,.cro 

late I I io I )-l .cs!\ ih o t int h ,s e e
,in.ts 111li lebt osertami 
relaive tothe si i() i dumikci ,ie trsi, itt nI)tvlytor, (INI). 
Chilha", but iWcwiolmmti . 
( ;iaItt.Cdt. ItIc!t 0f ( hu CcOt1ionter dcL line ss\as due to adverse 
woild L-c itheomcoiiclitli, in the eiil\ I N-;)", tle tilr'.,pecled 
dctcritliIti()i iII tl1C tL'el', ()l" llttld il t'I j)IOM siCtI' tn 'I0i , tlhe 
sharpi iilCtkI,,C in ittiemzCnlt;ial i ' I inI c'-,l rait s, ;mid fle tillexpected 
apl .cialitinlll the d0I lhtr, tihlItlhCi ctitliIated 1t !le Ieal cost of 
serviciI (*'hile', C'.,etu al det. 
0ss".sttei' totctar\Nevcrtlicss. a citlIl o theI t stabili/ation 
ploglait. lte price intlatioti wa%,Sue ce,,,li\ redlcCd IFotll several 
huiidred iperceil P yCear in the tiid- I'07 ,. 'tllitostfern 1y te 198 I, 
is ill order. l)id tile authorities ttake amt subtatital technical errors 
In the ;ad1titistration oftlicii criCttrse hMi' and dontes, ic fi'tlacial 
IOliciCs.' With the bCnCfit od IIitdLsi'it.,witt stMld tlev have clone 
differently to SIipcpit their Ciceral 'al of libcr izatioii. 
Vittorio ('tcoY hasr dCvelohWd the now cnCirally accepted View of 
where (hileatn h'inticial policy weit a.tray ('orbo I985, 1986). In 
orfer to curb domcstic price itflatim, bcittine inI early 1978 tile rate 
ofdepreciatitn iII the nominal exchallge rate was deliberately reduced 
below the diflerrcitial between inflation ill Chilean prices and that 
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prevailing in the intemational economy. The apparent real interest 
costs of foreign borrowing in dollars fell below those prevailing in 
domestic financial markets in pesos. The resulting huge inflow of 
foreign capital forced an undue appreciation in the r al exchange rate. 
This caused a profit squeeze in Chilean industry and agriculture and 
lefaUitson domestic bank loans. Tile subsequentbanking collapses 
in 1982-83 were worsened by previous regulatory lapses which had 
permitted the commercial banks to accumulate too many bad loans: 
However, what the Chilean financial authorities should have 
done with respect to foreign-exchange and interest-rate policies in the 
late 1970s remains to bespelled out. Let us review their policy 
options. 
The Monetary Stabilization Problem of February 1978 
What was the economic dilemma facing the Chilean authorities at the 
beginning of 1978, prior to their fateful adoption of an "active" (my 
terminology, McKinnon 1981) downward crawl for the exchange 
rate?While the government had virtually eliminated any need for the 
inflation tax as a means of public finance, in 1977 the rate of price 
inflation was still over 60 percent. Although itwas substantially less 
than in 1975 and 1976, the authorities rightly thought this inflationary 
momentum to be unwarranted. 
Prior to February 1978, the exchange rate had been "passively" 
(but only partially) adjusted to compensate for internal price inflation 
and to roughly balance international payments-with significant 
restrictions on inflows and outflows ofprivate capital. Even so, avery 
sharp real appreciation of the curl,'ency took place from 1975 to 1977 
(see Table 11). This increase inthe real value of the peso was probably 
important in reducing price inflation from more than 300 percent in 
1975 to less than 70 percent in 1977. 
True, the peso was greatly undervalued in 1975 because capital 
flight forced a rapid depreciation of the currency. Yet, if the same ad 
hoc exchange rate adjustments had continued after 1977, the real 
value of the peso could well have continued to increase. Few people 
now realize that the exchange-rate policy the Chilean authorities were 
following prior to February 1978 was not sustainable indefinitely. 
33 FinancialLiberalization and Economic Development 
Table I I 	 Chile: Measures o1 International (ompeitih eness 
(1979 11 = 1.0) 
I'NiI'N". PXI'N I' I/IN I'1AN ]'X/I'M Noillinal 
FIchwlnge Railt 
1975 
I I WO-1l) 1 (3N1O52 2.1, I 101 2.57 
II 1(64 I 6) I 677 2.-1,1 1.15 4.30 
1II 1.7(13 1.7(07 1 7(5 2 2()5 I 1 2 (03 
IV I 752 1777 1.765 2.2S I 014 7.5(0 
(1476 
1 1.2 1 774 I 753 2.21h 1.1)24 10.48 
II 1.52' 1522 (.521, 1,923 ((tt'5 12.43 
III 1.141) 1.371) 1155 I.12N 1 022 13.91 
IV I I5-1 1 277 1.2 0 1427 I (79) 10.55 
1(77 
1 1(1)o 1 151 112; 1.251 1.0501 18.43 
11I 1).)(" 0,9)t90 (0946) I 1.1 H 5 1t)44 
III (I.0) ('(40 (()(25 1(M59 1.033 22 2(1 
I\ 
('(75 
0(.15.954 (() 0 1, 1 i 171 1.015 25.(,) 
1 1)IUP 0907 (199)2 I.10 0I)1.952 29.I 
II 1.(1o L)(17 0.IN, 1.079 0.93 31.25 
111 (( ) ( X75 ((.15 I.(47 (.876 12.6) 
( , (.'4'l4 (V )I) 7 (('47 1.(165 O.WN(5 33.55 
I ((,997 0 924( I55 I.MK)) ().60, '(.72 
[ ((AX) I (0 ) I.XXI (5 ) I (XHI 30.20 
III 1(82 (15 1.132 10(51 1I'5NWAX) 
IV (((.) I (M .42 1.032 1.121 39)Ql 
19J80 
1 0'9W' I Is 1.4(25 (R9420 1 ILI 3().IX) 
II ( 025 .W'2 I.4544 )5 -I .175 3S. l) 
I 
('(5 I 
(4V)0'74 0.tl)1.5 5 ((71.8 I1(-( 00.19) 















IV 0 723 (41,1 M.071)2 ()(6 (t42 1.1[m) 
1982 
II (.71 ; 0611 (O(N,I ((1.1 ((57 ((4 4 
1I1 0, Q; 7 7 (i 7s y,,) SO)() ((.1 .. I 1 
IV I(l(,, UISit) I (" (( ( 7 4 69'.281) ) 
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'Itltponcltt l 'dt \ tol Al Ililll. J,111,111. , illedit I L ("llde 	 ((Letl(hlll
Bl .1/d1 , . and l1ct.5 
StIAtlC IlhCstRLt II t011 11 1 I t)111-C I a , haw ,t ti,UJ 11.' hIL'4t11) ( N|' (',Ih I tlllt , ,l.1 I~hll "* I dex is 
aho ;tlq' ~ ttI c ti hOo l'11h11w, 
,

P)X I!l(t, ltt II\ I pl ),, al'ltl~,1I~% I d o Md; ,i l l itJilc\ptrt coppe)r.I pm C l c c\c~ltdliy 
W\ ' NO~llhill Im mell iluallutaL %kov aCl,' 
I'T,O]collitlt ' IX lf]tl 1 hlmtlht l r l( P 	 P'M%,111th t)0+lh' 
SoulP c':(Colb(,I NO . It) 
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What was needed w\a's a "lforward-looking" monetary policy that 
WouId stahi hIIe leel um price ex pectat ions, while11he donueCStic pric 
at the same timel prevent lurther apprcciation iI the real exchange rate. 
At the heelmn riin I'78,, .('UUosubI.attial chan- iII ronetary and 
te;XChanc2e ra.te policics \ ils \%a-,ritllcd lo break thc econon\'s infla­
tionlarv n onent ul. ThI hiehfy d esirale fiscal rcflorms v thcnl­
selves w nro sufiient to csta lisi ntonetary control.ut 
The )omestic Monetarist Solution 
O".'r schol of lotell...CtivCly :dvoCatCd in Chile in 1977-78­
was the standard l:riedirmn-Nlcltte approach of"doniestic mlonctlr­
isnm." 'o) cure Control m'.cr thle d cst ic Ioltoearv b e, etas.rid of 
capital ;tcouilit rItriCtious, atld float the .XCIlan rate. Them taret 
sllic uoncst"- ' IC l ct r et Stli as M , or , to grow lit a 
sniiootll ra" c ll,i-sIcll \, ith futullr l)rice-lc\'cl "tl ilitv alid/orl so ic 
dCelibcrtel pic l ti,,inll;tliOill+ A C.re lc rllmoulil icllle effect 
,'YOUll tldirt_' fe l)l ltto11 s.I W i .. i et i1 flt1 I r\ . _\l+c tutio 

Ill rimY Vie'\',, thi,, str l't~t prov
, Ot.' l '.elI h d Ill orc devtsnat­
irg to [lie ("lilcaml .ceo ol t alV
IIN',r \. hll ilo hilmlper . BcauILsC of
 
tile i'ast pace (d lifin cill trlul, lr (the marmlliI ri
llinto ti 10Fn l caslh 
balance, \%, raplid!'. iIcr ln,ii s,inlat', on diMni isltdIhI). thme uthori­
ties could not ,te.iatel', et_lni te V.,hat tint "t ' at of t '.' in ill 
doimestic nmlo:rnlMll ald M ,sholuld ... :\r'd lt le I)f ',d .s that 
the ratio of MI t( (1N1 Wts iMIdCels unsltbhlc.) Thi>S utlnpredictazblC 
growlth ill nnllCt:l\ acenete, is claratriC i_ aIn' ec MMV t1,t 
is nwivlng !rm,stptl  a more ihCrtli/e I fil .rcialn 
W"Itelrl. SsUlpoelC [cvl.enriruc dircctly tiehten,ttrcd co r over the 
Illon taiI'.\ iase aId s,,e ,nl .resccd itiflatiomnar\ .''pccla.tI,0ls. 
With arll o n l 'ccorllllcaplinal ill tile hlalcc of paynents. a massive 
shilt ill irntcrm,tinmal p rtlnlio peruler lc , ill l'vor lith: ('hfilcanm peso 
would have ccir're'l al \va\ -perhaps c'lcnn earlier. 'lie problem of 
excc,,,,ivccapital inltk s%., ,tilt rel1imai'old . 
Beca.s asse nmimk,, ' it adjustI U lh fater tLO gtoods nmarkets, Inl 
1978 a floa'time ('hilc larp v,%w'lllhve+aplpreciated sharply-even 
in nor1mirMl terrIS. A0thouh price irnflatimn milight then have fallen 
mor1e apidly rrI978i LCSite tie presence o! back ward-looking wage 
indexing), the gross Crvaluat ion of the psCO WOmuld have occurred 
IIIIuCI SOItoICI 11d CrushelId 11hC PI'Ohl~ihiiv 01* 11Che(Iileani ex\port and 
COlHJ)ILICt(l in~ mlid N7) 
111 aiplhh\\tc llA illl Hi,'e 
w atilaill I rM'AI\ 2 dI ('l (I d C ~~~itlilIt7~ai ecutilI0 
silhIc [ c.1.\cl dtslti. I i ai it't pti\ ate c atlil l d f­
no(lali~.lc twlkcd~II 11 \C1i i \ s \si I c ltS 
c8lllth \ cllltltlCu8 
Thei ainge rate 1c I,, Ih i i 97 t h .e e.chhleraFrId-
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which was sustained through JulnC 1982. Ihis tabl ta system broke 
down with the exchange devalulations of 1"-)82 in the midst of general 
,:Co0tf11 ic decline. 
The 1Indexing Prol lem 
This muovementIto all active downward crawl--olorward siaili­
zation-in the nominal exchange rate by the Chilean iovmcrnnlent was 
not itsClf' a policv mistake a, iP,often sugg,'stC(l. Rather the absence 
of SU-IH, Suppomti\e capital-markct and labor-market policies---as
Well as cxternal ,,If e>,evcntatllv c;ll -, d the stabili/ation p0llCv to 
tail. 
('onid,dII the laboIIirsIt.I iket (o rho co 1rectly c npha,,i the 
ilICliist , ,, l Vnc\c ci the itl". arld-look mi inldc.,in, ofthe nilinialexclialne ratc. and the back,\at--I)kin, indein 01o111011e waCes 
vhlilch is olCIe found iII ieh-inflaitiOji .cot lic . Chileani ,,aies 
were linked Itithe ,.s Iatle ol inflationt. \\ hiich was %cv.\ hi'hi rClatiVe 
to that ticiPlitcd in the ftLur Ts.IlS, d5iiitI fieuitldl CtlIlpeltitiolIl 
fClill IIC\\,lv liberali/el frcid j tiaii I)( the ,..ver-s.,l ,c dowward 
cra\',I in the Ionmlilial cx.helmI , ratec ,l' ,cd pliCC inflatioj in tie 
tiaables industries. 21'\1th in 1110v continued 
faster pace. Indeed. hom carl' 1978 to crly 198,2. (orbos data in 
lable I Ishow that the ratio of tradal,, le, to Vacs fell ii>iV than 
50)percent. 
facs a3ta, IIIIuch 
IlII retropect,. it as. if1oc\sCCn, 11011 ac in [Iblrur 1978 should 
havv been put nl the ,M)Ic Irward-looking tablita as the exchange 
rate. Similarly, all otherl prices hich wcc indexed to ongoing 
itflatioii, such as 1hrgcsthe lsefol of public ntilities, should have 
been l)ut On the same tahlita. 
Putting wages on the solne forward-lookinog indcexilg pr)cedure 
need lot hav, eliminated the o'crvalmtioin prohlem entirely. Al­
thoulhI waeCs . orld be fixed inI terms ofl'the prices ofltradable goods, 
tihe price of ittradaleCs conld continac to edge upV'.Lards. I However, 
bcause ,ages are quite dominant inI deterining the cost of ilon­
tradable services, the sharp fall from 1978 to 198 1shown in column 
(3) of Table I I wo .Id not havc occurred. 
Nevertheless, il the economy tended to absorb large amounts of 
foreign financial capital when the exchange rate was pegged by the 
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t:lhlita. file dollic"lic Illone) ,Lll)lfl \kOUld CNIMIld HIRILII 111d On', 
illfkitiollm-N pl-c""urc \wuld IIICCI 111C 1)1'iL'C, Of IIIOYC 
thall Iradahlc ,. III thc pic"ClIcc od Ilia""i\C capital ild'Itm". even 
COITCLA" %kd'-'CIMIC\ Ilioll \wuld lw[ 11111\ rcmlkc lilt' 1)1.()I)[Clll ill' 
VIVOM2 C\Cllllll!-'(' 
III it k 11M% (WHIM1111% hCHo.-I "\11chrolli­
/,atioll llldc\ Hwll pwcM ult, 1111do.-I o-oll(nd ill 
\W111ol ',LIICI IML' I)W\Clllo. d ninch A thc -,rws 
mcrValti'llitm od 111c Pt"() 1111 \ c h1cl ith"cr\cd. Bill Il\ Ll"c tile 
d(mimnd 1tlllcl illml lllm illl ! 1() l hxcd 
mic., 
In [lit' C\H(Alw 1,,c Mwic Illo.- 11(milinal 
prio.c" Ill ill,- hill'llwil tomld hc li llwd iIllllIcdl IIcI 1) 
(ICLAVC. I Ilo.- JL1111W ItW', Mild "111116 pl,)Inllk! Ilc 't I I wd 
rmc ah " cH ah H\ A Awl mmmml 0 1", umkr Nwir cmunt No 
Im \ ard 1(1()k I I I,!-' i'llfln'l \%m ild IIc lict. I\ to I I I c I 01 II I (ho., I I I I w t I I lcc-
IIICI I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I , I I I'\ I I I I I ;I k I Id Ic ilm ilI I i c ( I I I to Ic I I I I lit- I 
I I C I I C I I I I I I I I LI I I I I I Ic I c I t I it I I I ( o. %k I I I w c (m t ilItIC d 
I I Io A l \ I i I I I I I I LI o I I ) C " I I I) I I C " . 
Ill 1!1o, nc\\ k I1ho-l ;11ZL-d 'Ill lc m cL (mmm id c, I II I()\o. ­
C\Cl IllC 111M C h) 11cC lkldc (k-,wllcd W lo"'MILIHIC IVI'like 
pricc'). Ililt') " l-'clici'd llcc/C Ol lh)111111 11 111 
WlAiCC, \%k1HIkI IlAVV IWCH (011 A 6111 111C I Cl 11 11LIW 01 OIL' 
hcilw c(miltd1o.-d h Illc 
Inclit 1111mil "ll, II I !2clik-i'li 11CCA'. MIL. cmild 
CXPCC1 "WilL, pm c 111IL111('11 h) (MIJIRWC\Cll 11 %\CICPLII (m tile 
SM11C LINILI tl'l IlK' C\t IIJII 'C I AtC. 
111l-'ClICI 11. 1 1W I!ICAICI I 11C )I , tl (I L 01 InJC1 ing 111po.-m" Inp[ ivalc 
ll'Ml,,A tik 111',, 111C (Ilk' 1w "11cwhillL, mil Ilic lahlita for 
some A"imilliL, thc ('1111c.111 L,(1\CIHHR:lIt tilw.illillu, to 
lindc1litko: i z,--L-nciA Imtc ficc/c, Ilk' 1mt.;lId clm l 1(mard a 
fiXCLI CWIhlII'-'o.' I I(C \ 1111111 t\\o) llk)t wo,'Ill \%I0IIL, -C\ CH 
with tile belichl ()I p1m idCd lh it ()Ilicl o)ntlollcd ill 
tile ccoll(IIII-\ clc Ik t, ()Il dit- I Ihlil l. 
Scaling DoN 11Nonlinal Interes( Ratus ill Line Nith the Tablita 
In 101-inwiv 147N, 1IIMIld 11101V 0)IIIpI-clIcII"ivC financial measures ill 
the capital markeis have heen laken I()&,sist with [lie macrocconoinic 
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stabilization of the Chilean price level'? Except to advocate more 
stringent (unspecilied) controls oil lor-igni capital inflows, authors 
writing on the experiences o the Southern Cone do not seem to have 
fully Conic to grips iit iiOs tihcial issue.
 
Clearly, evryl'e now 
agrees that molley wages-aloii witi 
other signilicant prices which thc governrment conlrolled-should 
have been put on the Name Worward-looking tablita as the exchange 
rate. Blut does it then make sense I lcave ex\tremely high roillinal 
interest rat s--- over 8( ipercent iii 1978 ---oit peso loan' in place whell 
the gove rnent is pili such I latl cIonI'c c'lit'C Io price Slabi ity? 
Politically, ('hilean workcrs \, ould he leNs likely to accept I scalin, 
down of their nominal claiis \ hen ni iminal interest rates remained 
so high. P erhaps i stadar idnolilal illCrCst rate ol psC'o loalls, whose 
lerllt UctreC as iilleCXCd to the tbllitaI ishould have been pI0.lIUl­
alt at the sae lic that thI nw "C policy was11 e xcha, I rate 
anirioiCCd ill I'h 1978. lhe authorities could aill to keep iheerulr\ 

standard loall ratMe bIeCcu 
 8 and 2l pcicc'ii in rc! ierrn , with real 
eCplosit ratcs 2 to -) pcic'jiltgc point" helow this level. Real interest 
rates in (hile would then have, bIi 1t1C ill line with the suCcssfull 
Tai waC, cx pc'ic'IcC discusCd aho\vt. 
Withte beiC it INId1slf , C ,ra Cegnrnnn,ii to understand that 
full liberaliaiorll of the banks dUrilt, a htieh aid variable inflation is 
1li)f warranted. I'litulk Iiehih ICA interest rat'c, will likely prevail ini 
Such circurIilaricCs leali ito ad0veLrCe risk ;elc'cioi----oth in tlhe 
ltualitol'erorllank horro\ c\ ocoiet orward nlrd iritebalks' 
oVI behavior." These proble'is With prirudietial coiirol over bank 
loan p~lrifolios bccoUe rl'agilitiCd ii llStressful peiiods when tlie 
central barrk is tryiig---ie wi vor,aiother--Io iripose tlight"lll oney
 
in 01(1 r to clisiiflaiC :'CCC:SfiuIv.
 
The Korean ExperietCt 1979-83 
Are there precedenls of ithLTr governments scaling down domestic 
norinal interest rties in tihe :'ourse of a ilajor disinflation'? The 
Korean governleni's successful price-level stabilization of 1979 to 
1983 provides one such example. 'he relevant iiterest-rate data are 
provided in Table 12.i 
Although munch less than Chile, Korea Suffered from inflation 
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averaging over 20 percent during 1979- 1, In ra terms, its sutandard 
notninal loan ratc of 21) percent (made some1C\,hat greater by the use 
of comnpenlsating won btlances) was slithtily negatixe. 
Then, with ,t big fisacal inp 1rovltnent and monetl'ary stringency, 
Korea"; internal intlation iate \;as driven do n to about 7 percent in 
1982 and Onlv 3 percent in 98.X. The Korean authorities anticipated 
declining iutlationby quicklvrltdIcinigthes ta1C rlIdaloanate in1taIges 
to I(0 petce int h inid-l 982. Ncverthcless, the heiiil rate becale 
positixc ill real terlms-- see the tar righ-tiaid coltnn ofl'able 12. 
Over the samL. illter"vil, tile staldard short-ll-lll iHteret tatC on won 
deposits I, to 0(.0 percent.astdced Irtoin 14. 
It should ai, b nted 0tl the Bld, ()I Korea did tot atteompt to 
tse its,Ce.hliai, rate a, the torciilg x'ari:ic lor dOtijcilic plrice-evel 
stal'iliz'ation unlike (hile. Id . "lalhc (3 sho\,, thatl, trlll 198() 
to I)83, the- wont deprctiatcd aiiit ilt thaln the reductliont in the 
doilte"lic inflatil ratc. 
Ilit h-caOis,o 111Cthl. KO t rieii tinotL ,eotti \\ as l ;i , tllv 
liberali/ed as tht. ('hi Icaiu. the Korca.i:eox t lllt)lt did llOt biC\VC t1ir 
ifftetna!iolnlal 'Olltttl it\ :irtbilta c i htbei i'.,d to stzhtili/C the 
dol ,isticpric Icxc. Is-teal. theno il i ate WaS Inll­
aged by an itmttnal dowiixx;drt, 1too adjut, pasivCly to declining( 
domestic itt'latiol. Thus ts pricC-lCvCl stahility x,'as scCurCd, the 
syndhon c ot4 cxelal tworvaation was aoiddl. 
'his scaliltg do..x n tl h imeti(: intcest rates a, iitlhtoliln ,Ioxed, 
while ilaintai ling tie rate (tI town alrd .rav,'l iii tile xoil against the 
dollar to reflect tihe iitlatioii difreittia! betveetn l,tica and the 
United States, prveitCd undue1.1 incCti\e, to tt)\Vc toreign capital 
into the KoraCll cono,0-y.vnoo, the Korean governuclet mnain­
tained substantial Cont ls On tile capital tc.ounllt to prevent a further 
untoxvard butildtip of ilte-iatiollal ilndetdnCss duiinc the liberalhza­
tion process. 
A Rationale f'or Interest-Rate Management 
hi the course ota inaJOr disititlation, why should interest ratcs on bank 
assets and liabilities be rececld by del iberate public policy? Shouldn't 
nontinal interest rates he bid down by the narket, be allowed to fall 
naturally, as inftlation recedes? 
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Table 12 Korea: Nominal and Real Interest Rates 
(;NPIra 1ll.il r .ll' l urIlIfN',ii~iI,l RrcdI - N ,N.,ill 1.,I Rc~I 
r .............tilC,Ninild Reld N'i,lIA Real­
1979l*I/4 21,1 

































































































































































































































































































i K ii,., , 
First, IhC LUesliUoll of Corr.c Ill IroctcOIlll ic signaliiw. If allyindividual scc ver hi eh its linlial iIntercst ratcs above recordedirlflalijIl. ilc cMld 1111erpret thi,, as a ".,igalal 11111it other people inIhC C1O2IomyIV ex)CC, 1ctdiilhtitoj 10 ll liltl ad. tllhe hilbizationprogra11 to fail e ven tlotlh th hi h1111I min~al ratcs could beexplained (,.I pot (Io ther grounds. InlCCd . itelOnug h irms, borrowheavily at very high liollinal rates of1 interest, it becomlles more 
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probable that the government will keep the inflation rate high in the 
future in order to bail them out. This reinforces private fears that 
inflatiol will not v.'ind down. 
Second, when inflatitrri'rv cxpecta ilons are still hih and uncer­
tain, the probhl (adVel, rik seWlc1CtIBi .o wtl Ir ricroecoloillic level 
in the Sigliti-\Veiss isV'S tlii'nlalV acUte (Slirlit/ and Weiss 
1981 ). Incoiltracill,- at al\ nonrimai inttrst ratesubhlantialiv above 
Table 13 	 Korea: I\change Rates atrnd International Competitiveness, 
l1I78-85 Ic I t%.Io ,r 
I'ar ,irtdQ hurr1'  %Nu Norr11 hul Real' 
IV 12: I 1177 914.8 
1 125 ] 12o.2 
125 r 123.8 107.1 
ill 125.1 123.4 107.2 
IV 125.1 127.5 112.2 
1980: 
106.2 1111.4 113.7 
II 11)2.0 102.8 IW. 6 
III 98.8 97.1 98.1 
IV 93.1 90.6 9(.5 
1981: 
1 93.1 88.3 9h.0 
11 901.8 90.0 1i0O.1 
III 89.0 92.2 1M58 
IV 88.3 89.9 11)2.3 
1982: 
I 85.3 89.2 11)2.0 
I1 83.2 88.9 101.9 
Ill 81.7 89.9 113.1 
IV 81.4 89.8 102.5 
1983: 
1 80.4 85.5 99.4 
I1 78.7 84.3 97.2 
III 77.2 83,8 9b. I 
IV 76.2 81.9 930 
1984: 
76.2 81.5 93.2 
II 75.9 81.3 92.5 
II1 74.8 82.7 9.0.1 
IV 73.1 82.7 93.4 
1985: 
1 722 83.2 (14.2 
Anrincrcadt iurdrtce .r)' ti I 
STrnhdt,- Vt~gh hVII 
' Arrli 111 tdui rchl ar. I .lrc llr-.rciit n w iri , 'I (urpic, rc 
Fu n ; ) rrirr .).ImahIl.) I"[ : I i. , rtt i',rcr \rrghr'l 1 ,I.K rcmin Aitlurilics uinO 
1:linid SIn) clrhrr, 
42 RONALD 1.McKINNON 
the "nornmal I( to 20 percent rangee approxinmtine a race,.t real rates
 
Of"rturn, the hoT'rower tl bet 
on what the [Ut1re- inIlation late will
 
be-- rid also determine the riskinesxs o'his ()\,i pro.Iet. IeCwill then
 
accept a riskier project in the honcs ol 
 1lvorahie Inh vield 1inc'e
 
inflationl doe.,i't bai hini ot 
 ;n tue u del ltatilwav.11t. s ,um 

131ut Ihie iul'l
Wcs,,m mi-\h'uas,I',u,na titaul chick (miadv'erse risk
 
sc i' .lioll. l Ii1 tni',ul illitulh ll\ ill ch;tu-,( a l i aii-m',trk.,t
hs,,,, 

r. ;l,_c\ollI it, t..andI lL i thI (aids;ud,'ctimc,llv uquivalont
Iciurl .,. N )F,i\ bet\cii 11ii lc-, vitilhc, 'iinkc ,tlslle.uiuj "s,-aV 
h~ d r,, ) i tho,,c ,lcv m(t i tM ( i,iiN t,it Irt,,'tu, "l he,t!'cr 
tk( ld J.\withiamore tmitl t r it'r ti lii titlll+,,c,,cr. fil,, I;IIIH ti.
tlk lcllt.\ to\\,.;Ird". prl'tl ia.l~+ allll -llIloll­
h.'n
hI';11],I i1d\rt~ , Ih,,.Cri01,,l, 1tH0 clrlillt.td Ili ofl hanllks,the c.',',c 

.'L'I'40(',I1l',
(d1 thill 110:1C "It lnl Iw I I . ' . \\h( k''i k /,/ /, 1'( )tol,.epot~q 
ilP'l ll [11C. L.L'tv'r.ll.'0! 1,t111 l h 11,1i 1:tl CL, 1' iMlSll c Ids] Itos.,,+' 

pr(bicltui ofds iu Jlu \,tic.
l Iltlt. tiiillo cl\ d.su,,.tlle ivcr private

bank, nm , \\cli iiudit~kc 
\i, i,-,k,ii , u IMiuul\ hih \ie.ld 
lenidII(I plht pt th lad\ ca"Iin l c , 1_111t.co.. , ajorclle
+ m ,.
losses v,ill li\(.to e d h% lie, lllltta\ alltluoitv while Iet
 )'lit sl i11 f,\I u;\uhlc u0tt \,ill 'Ill
' ,Ilace'titliu m iwI'!u,(hInk
 
ri,,k\ lh Imu tl'mul ilt uuituitul+ ' . Ilflit tis', ums,iIis vuul illc[iCies 
lh.,it.
tl' ('hi Hmkuul ,,teu il I to ;1r't',tioli l u ulof
 
the Inuirk, ill t (. m't t 

¢2-, le ,tllina 
lJ u u. a,w l ;tIsetl"as el' ili 
cfcltu us.
 
l:\Cll ill Il htilt .klc hui l nhulit;ul uui'ukkt ol tI Ititte(I States,
,.l 

f'deratl (ulp ,sit iilun;um isI,,.atilL, tc' iiur l)iuus for bank sulier­
visor,, iu utuluIj tu takii i
u l c ri,,k , cm muiicial haunks as Iasv,'ell 

S.aVil-, Miud 1oatn iustitutiotmu,, (,,cc Kute 1985). litu levelupino
cu.OUliltV ',,itl nt air equitiesi, iuurket or ,,ll-dhcvleupcl aC.U ilti1g
stanidards alld lure.priae but insured) hanks aie the principal
lenders, tile piudxbilit ,, of ,.tital-Ilrriket equilibriuu vith viN' 
hih r" hitut iutir,, rttes nid tUIRl,;l" ,,m1h e adversc risk selection 
is mllluch ereatmr (W'ho I)). 
)t'i,:!tllotl crt,11irlii spervC u)iny cont'ol over private banks can 
prevent .!uuhIe risk t;tkinl al falselv hi-h real rates of interest,. this
snpeurv.iir doe_'s ot ,tarante that the governrent it.self won': exert 
pressure to make bad oai!'The price-level stabilizatioi of 98)-84
was ve.ry snccessl Il,but tilie K orean governilent 's pressure on the 
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banks in the l197()s was less benign. Because f its determi Inat ion to 
suipptrt the developmet of' doncstic hcavy industry and Korean 
contractors tudertakine major 'onstruction projccls in the Middlh 
Fast and elsev here, the Kore ucrninnt coeced (lte hanks ilto 
miakine ri,ky linp-itn ln -mall of whilh :1re I](,\\ liolper­
forni inc. In the h.. ank 0I still provdidetIN80, ,tle Korc: ili/cd 
credit line, WoTlicilnl Li,,COtiI1tin a! bClhM.'.imtI interest rates) to 
V'.,iOtl CtOIIInn 'citl banm ks iII Mue 11111 tile.\ IIhInliIve' atlln dvoid 
bankruttc. ,..'-,cpine " Inat,, on their banks. As oftheseL l l]()7()f, 
I1)8 , thi bad-loan , vIld(Il)I c )iitinlClid to illdcr the Ifull libCraliza­
tion of' the Korean fitmcial ,\ sten,detslite thle cc tl monetary 
stabili/at i0n. 
Implementing light loitey in the Transition From lligh to 
Low Intlation 
Inrctr),,pcct. it SCCII's Clear that ( hile should haVe ti.lhitcned tII nIote 
in the doetc fdw of bank cedit millcluivc of that financed by 
for.ion tmoit',i ,'i) . hi clUli1in IiCt ol ' (Wlluct :l a' index­
in.--and relie.d les,,- o) tile sclaI1C, at,at ve,r or secutine tie 
,prieclVCIL. IcautC ()I atetC I)oentiatl piblenn \Vilh aIdvers risk 
o\ llilt..", (ml ninInIalzlselectinut, tIlcl 1tL i ilm \ r ii V:r l i l ( t(nd 
real) 1iteCtVS lii workrie, COt l , kl 
Tie Korean s I iiip Lil., ecoIui/etl 1his inn iu hmibtit their 
SUCCssfl price-\lCl st:ibiliitioni. Noliial ImIerest l,1ates \w'cl're 
scaled dowt ciitent \k ithi keepuin I al rat',s lpoitive_, albit below 
inarkct-clearing Ilel, Althm-i the Bank of0Kor:n al,,o reduced 
reserve CqIrenInIS as[, iscal policy imIprovel, ceiural batIk credit 
was rationed to( Ilhecomntircial banks mid llori ign capital inhflows 
were limilted il order to curC the dul',ireLl LIelltiom w.vithout sigtIifi­
cant exc iea -I te_emral\alull. I( olt-mvh ill ltlltey keus was also 
scaled down b\ the Ko rean viineint.! 
[hat is, tihit nn1oiev V,as iiliosed whilI real ratcs of interest were 
kept positive and fairly COIntitI bV dCCree)' Thi, mn1t that, iln oretr 
to disiiflatc, the KorLain banking ,ystInI as a whole rationed credit to 
the tvate sectot. I lowCvC, bccausc the Korean government "s fiscal 
deficits wCre sinMultanCously rednced (is waIs alSO the catsc inl Chile), 
the real flow of loanablc funds to the p~r''ate scCtor actually increased, 
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thus relieving the supply constraint on domlestic output. No net credit 
squeeze on the private sector was necessary once tle Korean govern­
ment, and its various special agencies, stopped directing the flow of 
bank credit to itself. 
iven tile equally pond and perhaps even more favorable fiscal 
conditions existigL, in (Thil, it sccsSe .. with the benefit off hindsight, 
ofcoulrse--.that ill February IQ78 the (iiilcans shOuld have Wl)lloved 
an internal interest rate. eka. c rate, and bank credit policv riore like 
Korea's of'I 8 1-83. [lie'n sonic OWthe burden of brineing aboutdisinflation could lic e)CCntaken offtnominal exchangc-rate policy, 
and colltrols oil capil,1 itflows (fdtrini2 the price-level stabilization 
WOuld lh.. c p)rcvcitCd lsuch ,CVcrC ovcrvaluoati(on ol Chile's real 
exchanc rate. 
A ('oncluding Nott' 
Despite the dillicultiCS cnuLrCatd above, the l)otential gains f'ro1
 
uC',,': tillv stalbi h 
 g the domestic pric, level while retaIning 
co l)etitillcICSS ill l'r.itll trade arc e inomoLs. 
Korca'S (N' _,rowh and fiitancial dCvelo)ment since the suc­
cessful I98 -84 stabiliiatiorn have been truly remarkable. The rapid 
decpCnine oif fi naimncial flos, k, th1 the Korean ccolloilly has made 
possiblI fl2c nt rl)ivnners' ofCfllolrignIdbt th1r1ulh tIrfe Slupluscs. 
Not oil\ ha c bank dcposits coiittinuld to0 increase sharply relative to 
(;Nl hut tier has hcn a conuidcralc lerintcrninmig ofl the term 
strtcttre of t'Or-t)raeC inancC. Snll)stanntia nCw, iSSLuCs of' cnrporate 
bonds have bccn flhatlcd dlorcSticaltlv 
--In iridication of' financial 
matuirit\ that occurs, onlv i* people believe that the dorinestic price 
level \kill rcriniI kai]\ stable into the ind linitc future. 
The ('hilecnr firnarrcial collapse (of' 1)82-83, arnd tile orgy of 
Chile's fo0rCign borro\k i, ill the plrccedilig three vears, caused a sharp 
dowrturi in reaII I' lltu ard left the cconly vith a largc external 
debt. which will be ufiffiuh t o sCrvi.c iII the years to cole. Never­
theless, the libcrali/atioi ll)r.cSS was only iiterrultCd--albeit se­
verelv. Instead of reverting ito)ttcctitInisl, ('hile retaiied its open 
stance in both fturcign arid domestic triade. With the subsequent 
de\ aluratir 1tits currency m1adc AccCssary by the cumulative over­
valuation l)rior to the crash, exports are now growing rapidly, and 
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growth in GNlP has recovered. The modest ongoing inflation, in part 
a consequence of the devaluation, still inhibits tile lengthening of tle 
term structure of iiternal fiiniance, as in Korea: hut hank deposits as a 
share (ft(N P are again increasing, while the government continues 
to sort out the haid oald porl folios oti'nost of tile Chile'si, itor hanks. 
econlonlic position it',I) to le at lcasl as goid, or better,of sCeems 
than that of all the other major L atin American countries, Iolle of" 
which has suicCloede in ipllem'icnitline such ihtoroiighgtoin trade, 
fiscil. alnd fin ncial refomills. 
Finance and trade hihIrallitoll. \ih hommowim, amd leding al 
sUbstantial real raites of intL'i',l osihle ,i',lhle iprice level,i ide 
is not easy inl Is full l pot ellial plialls. Ncverthele, it reimins the 
onlV Ialrie i ll\VI i, lil i cce's, l coorin :CdevChplloent is 
Coicerneil. Th, ol W t ohesacmmiVcou',, main f 1)73 hook, 
Moel and 'alitalin/-<'oro , lJevetlo/nmenCt. It is iprhaps isign1 of' 
ai,,llcillc aic. howvrCvcl, that I amlil more t eiliphasizcnow inclineid 
the pillalls. 
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Notes 
I Teiinology introduced by Edward Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973). Furtherdiscussion ofoptimal financial management in arepressed economy is found in McKinnon and 
--~~tieon(1I9,91 ).- A -more general -rvlewkor the~literatu~re on Tiiil rerson andliberalization cai be round in Fry (1982) and most completely in Fry (1988). 
2. These ratiois are taken from IMF International Financial Statistics (various issues).The IMF defines I%,,,as money (line 34) plus quasi-money (line 35) plus deposits outsidecommercial banks (li, 45). M2 is Ustock tabulated as of30 June for each calendar year, whereas GNP is the flow of outIut for that year. 
3. From the well'known Scandinavian model of inflation, we can expect the CPI toincrease rapidly when productivity growth is high in tradables industries' but the cost ofnontradable services increases-as was true in Japan. But then I claim that the CPI becomes 
an invalid deflator for calculating real interest rates. 
4. For the more recent data, see the Central Bank ofChina. FinancialStatistics(compiled
in accordance with the IFS formiIt), May 1988. 
5. Are there other circumstalnces where a government could impose a fixcd nominalexchange rate directly without fear of real overvaluation? Consider the last stages of extremehyperiflation-such as that which occured in Germany from 1921 to 1923. When the pricelevel is increasing rapidly and erraticadly on adaily basis, hour-by-hour or even minute-by­
minute exchange rate quotations are the tnost efficient source of infi rmation telling people howfast inflation is actually proceeding. Eveiyone then keys on (indexes to) the exchange rate indetermining domestic prices and wages. :Significant backward-looking indexing tends todisappettr and virtually all forward contracting uses foreign exchange as the numeraire (see
Donibusch 1985).
Consequently, a dramatic stabilization of the exchange rate will immediately stabilizedomestic prices and wages--even if they are no,directly controlled by the government. Onemust be cautious, however: adramatic act such as the introduction ofanew cunecncy along with a new fiscal policy might be necessary to convince people that the exchange rate is likely to 
remain stable. 
61This adverse risk selectioil among nonbank borrowers and moral hazard for the(insured) banks themselves whcn the macroeconomy is unstable is analyzed in McKinnon (1989b, forthcoming). 
7. In the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) article dealing with adverse risk selection, the lending
"bank" was (implicitly) assumed to be risk neutral. However, one can show that when (1) thereis deposit insurance, and (2) macroeconomic instability causes positive covariance in defaultprobabilities among nonbank borrowers, the bank itself becomes a risk taker. Moral hazard
exists that induces the bank to make unsafe loans at interest rates which are "too high." See 
Ronald McKinnon (1989, forthcoming). 
8. Most students of economic development no longer have to be persuaded of theimportance of keeping positive real rates of interest at substantial levels in order to avoid thesyndrome of "financial repression" (McKinnon 1973: Shaw 1973). More recently, there hasbeen substantial empirical work showing that LDCs that maintain higher real iiterest rates, andhigh real financial growth, tend to be more successful (IMF 1983; Fry 1978), 
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